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iABSTRACT
The methodology used in the PL-MOD code has been extended
to include the time-dependent behavior of the fault tree components.
Four classes of components are defined to model time-dependent
fault tree leaves. Mathematical simplifications are applied to
predict the time-dependent behavior of simple modules in the
fault tree from its input components' failure data.
The extended code, PL-MODT, handles time-dependent problems
based on the mathematical models that have been established. An
automatic tree reduction feature is als.o incorporated into this
code. This reduction is based on the Vesely-Fussell importance
measure that the code calculates. A CUT-OFF value is defined
and incorporated into the code. Any module or component in the
fault tree whose V-F importance is less than this value will
automatically be eliminated from the tree. In order to benchmark
the PL-MODT code, a number of systems are analyzed. The results
are in good agreement with other codes, such as FRANTIC and
KITT. The computation times are comparable and in most of the
cases are even lower for the PL-MODT code compared to the others.
In addition, a Monte-Carlo simulation code (PL-MODMC) is
developed to propagate uncertainties in the failure rates of the
components to the top event of a fault tree. An efficient sorting
routine similar to the one used in the LIMITS code is employed
in the PL-MODMC code. Upon modularization the code proceeds and
propagates uncertainties in the failure rates through the tree.
Large fault trees such as the LPRS fault tree as well as some
smaller ones have been analyzed for simulation, and the results
for the LPRS are in fair agreement with the WASH-1400 predictions
for the number of simulations performed.
The codes PL-MODT and PL-MODMC are written in PL/l language
which offers the extensive use of the list processing tools.
First experience indicates that these codes are very efficient
and accurate, specifically for the analysis of very large and
complex fault trees.
This work was performed under the financial sponsorship
by U.S. NRC, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.
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11. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODULAR DECOMPOSITION APPROACH
1.1 Introduction
The method of modular decomposition of fault trees has
recently become very attractive and has been proven to be a very
efficient and reliable technique for the analysis of large fault
trees [1] in the framework of the PL-MOD code written in PL/1
language.
The methodology employed by PL-MOD to modularize a fault tree
consists of piecewise collapsing and modularizing portions of
the tree. As a consequence, at the intermediate stages of this
process some nodes are eliminated from the tree while others
undergo changes in the type and number of inputs they have. In
the next section some of the mathematical concepts used in the
PL-MOD as well as the method utilized in the code are presented.
1.2 Modularization Technique: Its Mathematical Formulation and
Its Application in the Code PL-MOD
Birnbaum and Esary [1] define a module as follows:
"A module of a system is a subset of basic components
of the system which are organized into some substructure
of their own and which affect the system only through
the performance of their substructure. Rephrasing,
a module is an assembly of components which can itself
be treated as a component of the system."
The coherent structure theory plays an important role in the
analysis of systems using the modular concept. Coherent binary
systems are systems whose performance improves as the performance
2of their components improves. A coherent system is a system
(C,$) for which
$(x) < (y) whenever x < y i.e., x < y
41+ +-+ 1-
$ (0) = 0, where 0 = (0, 0,...,0
(i.e., a state where all components
(1.2.1)
(1.2.2)
fail)
= 1, where 1 =
(i.e., where all components perform).
Let C = (C,,C,.. .,C ) be
n
y = (y ,yy ) is the
and the Boolean structure
a set of basic events,
vector of basic event
function $(y) determines
then
the
state of the system (i.e., the top event in the fault
$ ( = if the top event 
occurs
10 otherwise.
For the AND and OR gates, the vector will be defined as
follows:
$AND (
$OR >
= l 2 '''n =
n
i=1
= 1 - (n- y)(l-y9.. 
.(l-yn)
respectively.
A component C is inessential to a system (C,$ ) if the
performance of the component can have no effect on the performance
of the structure, i.e., if
= $(o ,x) for all (-i,x)
outcomes,
(1.2.3)
tree).
(1.2.4)
(1.2.5)yi
n
i=1
);
$( x) (1.2.6)
3where
(1 ,x) = (x1 ,...,x 1 ,x 1 1'''' xn
(0 , ) = (xJ5 5 ,..., ,0,x i+1''''' n '
(*i,3) = (x ,... X , + ' Xn *
Since inessential components can be detected from a system
without any effect, we will generally assume that all components
in the fault tree are essential and thus avoid some complications
in the theory. Therefore, we always assume
$(1 ,x) > (O ,x) for all (-i,x) (1.2.7)
A cut set of a coherent binary system (C,$) is a set of components
QGC such that $( 9,1Q)= 0 where Q' is the complement of Q (i.e.,
C=QU Q'), and Q ,4 are the component performance vectors for
which x.=O when C.EQ and x.=l when C EQ'. A cut set Q is a minimal
cut set of (C,$) if there is no cut set P such that PCQ.
The path sets of the same system (C,$) are in fact the cut
sets of coherent system (C,$D ), where D(x) = 1 - 4- ). (1.2.8)
D
$(x) is called the Dual Structure Function of the system (C,$).
From the above definitions for a coherent function and by
using the definition of a module, one can find [1] the structure
function of the system using its modules.
Consider a subset A of components such that A C C. A is a
modular set of (C,$) if
A A' A )xA'- 129$(x) = $(x , ) = T[XA(-x),x ] (1.2.9)
where (AxA) is a coherent binary system, and T is the
24
structure function of a coherent binary system whose.components are
those C EA'. When A is a modular set we say that (A,XA) is a
module of (C,$). The application of this definition for a
fault tree is demonstrated for the sample faqlt tree given in
Figure 1.2.1. From what has been discussed so far in this
section, the modules of the fault tree can be easily obtained.
They are as follows:
(A={a,b,c}, XA= aU b U c)
where a Ub denotes the union
(A={d,e,f}. XA=d Ue Uf)
(A={a,b,c,d,e,f}, XA= (a Ub Uc)f
where (a')fl(b') denotes the
(A={g,h,i}, XA=(g Uh Ui)
of a and b
(d Ue U f))
intersection of aA and b
(A={a,b,c,d}, XA=( (a Ub Uc)[ld))
One of the useful representations of a Boolean function is
its pivotal decomposition about one of its coordinates, i.e.,
$(x) = x .*(1 ,x) + (1-x )$(O x) (1
If (AXA) is a module of (C,$), then from Eq. (1.2.9) we obtain
$x) = XA A ) A(l,') + [1-XA )] T(0,x ) (1
.2.10)
.2.11)
5G1
G2
GJG4
G3 +
a b c
FIGURE 1.2.1
SAMPLE SUB-TREE I WITH NO REPLICATIONS
6The method that is utilized in the PL-MOD code is based
upon the definitions for the modularization given above. For
example, the fault tree given in Figure 1.2.1 in which there
are no replicated componepts is analyzed below by assuming
that:
1. All the branches are independent, i.e., every intermediate
gate event in the tree is modularizable.
A2. The logic function X ( ) associated with each gate is
either "prime" or "simple" having no inputs from other
"simple" gates of the same type.
Thus, the fault tree of Figure 1.2.1 can be changed into another
configuration as shown in Figure 1.2.2 which demonstrates the
finest modular representation of Figure 1.2.1 and is obtained by
coalescing gates G and G Its modular structure is given by
the following set of recursive equations:
A1 ={A 3 ,A 4 ,A 5  *(=XA 
=XA3-XA*XA5
A 3 ={a,b,c}, XA3=au b U c
A 4={d,e,f}, XA4=dU eU f
A5 ={g,h,i}, XA 5=gU hu i
Suppose that the fault tree in Figure 1.2.1 has a replicated
component as is shown in Figure 1.2.3. Then the following modules
are obtained:
7G3 4 G4 +
a b c d e f g h i
FIGURE 1.2.2
FINEST MODULAR REPRESENTATION OF SAMPLE SUB-TREE I
8Gl
G2 G i 5
gri
G 3
e I
a b r
FIGURE 1.2.3
SAMPLE SUB-TREE II WITH REPLICATIONS
9A3={a,b}, XA 3=a Ub
A 4={d,e,f}, XA =dUe U f
A5 ={g2'}3 XA 5=g Ui
Furthermore, these modules together with the replicated event,
r, will become the input to a higher order prime gate as shown in
Figure 1.2.4.
A(x  A A5 )
with the following modular minimal cut sets
S = (1,0,1,0)
S= (0,1,1,1)
It must be stressed here that the algorithm given by
Chatterjee [2] was devised for deriving the modular composition
of a fault tree given the minimal cut set structure description of
the tree. In complete contrast with this, the modularization
algorithm used in PL-MOD (Figure 1.2.5) derives the modular
composition of a fault tree directly from its diagram description.
It is important to realize that the modular minimal cut sets which
are derived from the above algorithm are compact representations
of the usual basic event minimal cut sets.
Once the modular structure of a fault tree has been obtained,
the quantitative evaluation of reliability and importance para-
meters of the tree are efficiently performed. In particular, the
G4
a b
10
6
G
d e f
FIGURE 1.2.4
FINEST MODULAR REPRESENTATION OF SAMPLE SUB-TREE II
r
G
g i.
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INPUT TREE
CONNECT INTER-
DEPENDENT NODESI
FIND ALL GATES
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CHECK IF
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"GATELESS" NODE NO
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YES
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CHECK IF MODULE
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MINIMAL CUT-SET
REPRESENTATION
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CHECK IF SUPER-
COMPONENT CON- NO
TAINS ALL THE
TREE COMPONENTS
YES
END
FIGURE 1.2.5
FAULT TREE MODULARIZATION ALGORITHM
'I
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probability of the occurrence of the top event is obtained by
means of a series of recursive calculations requiring the
evaluation of the probability expectation value of each of the
modules combined in the tree.
With respect to the importance measure, Olmos [3] has shown
how the Vesely-Fussell importance can be applied for modules and
how the importance of basic events can be easily computed from
a knowledge of the modular structure of the fault tree by
successively using recursive modular equations (see Chapter 3) and
the modular importance chain rule.
PL-MOD is written in PL/l language, because it provides
several features normally found only in assembler or list processing
languages. The essence of list processing is the ability to
dynamically allocate blocks of core storage to link these blocks
together into a structure to store and retrieve data from the
blocks. It should be noticed that list processing for complicated
data structures such as those required by.PL-MOD are very
difficult if not impossible to achieve through manipulations
using FORTRAN.
From the foregoing evidence the computational advantages
of PL-MOD to analyze and to evaluate fault trees in a modular
manner are:
a) The probabilities of the occurrence for the top and
intermediate gate events are efficiently computed by
evaluating these modular events in the same order in
which they are generated;
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b) The modular and component importance measures are easily
computed by starting at the top tree event and successively
using a modular importance chain rule.
c) For complex fault treees necessitating the use of minimal
cut-set upper bounds for their quantification, sharper
bounds will result by using minimal cut-set upper bounds
at the level of modular gates.
The efficiency and the accuracy of the PL-MOD method has
been demonstrated in reference [3] where PL-MOD has been tested
against MOCUS.
14
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2. TIME DEPENDENT FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
The use of modularization techniques in fault tree analysis
provides an efficient and fast method to determine the unavaila-
bilities of the modules and the top tree event. The modulariza-
tion technique is specifically advantageous for the analysis of
fault trees comprised of components with time-dependent behaviors.
This is because the time-dependent evaluation involves many
calculations of the same kind at different time steps.
In this study, four different classes of components are
considered to be used in the PL-MOD code for evaluating the fault
tree. The four classes of components are:
1. Time-independent or constant unavailability components
(i.e., A = constant).
2. Nonrepairable components in which the failure rates are
time independent.
3. Repairable components, failure of which is immediately
detected (revealed faults). The failure and repair
rates are time independent for this class of components.
4. Repairable components, failure of which is detected
upon inspection (periodically tested components).
A detailed discussion of these four classes of components is
provided in Sections 2.2 through 2.5. Subroutine NUMERO in the
original PL-MOD code is altered such that it can handle these
four classes of components mentioned above. A detailed discussion
of these changes is presented in Section 2.9 in order to clarify
method utilized in the code. The new code is named PL-MODT,
and the abbreviation, T, stands for the transient features of
the code.
In the PL-MODT code, all features of the PL-MOD code are
essentially kept the same. The new code is able to handle very
large fault trees with time-dependent components as well as small
trees in an efficient, fast, and economical way. During this
development, an attempt has been made to incorporate most of the
important features of the present time-dependent codes such as
KITT [ 6 ] and FRANTIC [ 4 1 into PL-MODT. These features
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
PL-MODT has been benchmarked against the KITT and the
FRANTIC codes, and the results obtained indicate that the code
PL-MODT is adequate for time-dependent calculations. Examples
of this benchmark analysis are presented in Section 2.10.
2.2 Class 1 Components: Time Independent Components
A time-independent leaf (component) in a fault tree takes
into account the presence of failures whose probability of
occurrence does not change during the component's operation.
These failures can occur essentially because of either a natural
phenomenon such as earthquake, flood, tornado, etc., or a
physical phenomenon such as operator faults, airplane crash, etc.
The occurrence of these faults has a specific likelihood which
is not time dependent. For example, if a fault tree leaf could
16
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be in n-different failed states given that there exists only one
non-failed state, then a Markovian model can be formulated such
as the one shown in Figure 2.2.1.
NON-
SATES FAILED a,, a2'' C
STATES STATES 2
... * n F1,21,-,n
Figure 2.2.1 A Markovian model for time independent
components
Each of these n failed states could be one of the failure
modes of the time-independent component. For example, faults
caused by an operator fault, airplane crash, or by a missile
produced from a turbine failure are three different mutually
exclusive faults occupying three failed states of the components.
In Figure 2.2.1, different transition probabilities are
given by a, 6, and 6. Therefore, the probability that the
component is in its non-failed state can be calculated as follows.
The transition matrix A is given by Eq. (2.2.1) below:
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NF F F2 ' F
NF al 62 ' 0 n
F 6 0 ...
A = F 60 a
- 2 2 2 All zeros
All zeros
Fn 6n an (2.2.1)
If P = [PNF PF '''' F ], then the solution of the
1 n
equation P . A = P would provide a discrete value for PNF
which is also a time-independent value for the probability
that the leaf is in its non-failed state. The following
example is given below makes the above discussion more clear.
Example: Figure 2.2.2 shows different transition probabi-
lities for a component with one non-failed state and two failed
states. The problem is to calculate the likelihood that the
component is in its non-failed state.
/2
NON-
FA ILED
STATE
1/4 NF 1/2
/2 4
FA IL FAIL
/2STATE S TATE 1/2
F F2
Figure 2.2.2 A Markovian model.
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The transition matrix A for this example is given as:
NF F F2
A =
NF ;2
F 2
F 2 (2
'2
0
0
2
Therefore, the matrix equation has the following form:
SvNF t bove Fe2 quatin[on NF fnF t maFr 2 
Solving the above equation one finds the matrix P
P = [ 4 k]
and thus PNF 2
2.3 Class 2 Components: Nonrepairable Components
For the class 2, 3, and 4 components, the total unavailability
can be divided into two separate parts: first, the probability
that at an initial time (t = 0) the component K is down (unavailable);
second, the probability that during the operation, component K
becomes unavailable. Therefore, one can write
T(t) = (1-Vi)w(t) + V id(t)
20
where
V. = probability that K is down at t=0
1 (t) = probability that K is down at t=t given that
K was up at t=O
Ad (t) = probability that K is down at t=t given that
k was down at t=O
For class 2, 3, and 4 components, we assume that V.=0 which
is a valid assumption most of the time for most of the components.
Therefore, it is assumed that T(t)=v(t)'
In the code PL-MODT the unavailability equations are formulated
in terms of 1 (t) since this reduces the amount of calculations.
The value of v(t) for any class 2 component for a mission
time t may be calculated exactly by the expression
t
Tv= 1-exp[- f 2 h(t) dt] (2.3.1)
t1
where h(t) = hazard rate (instantaneous rate)
t = stated time duration of the mission which begins
at time t and ends at t2 '
Eq. (2.3.1) is the general form of the unavailability and does
not contain any approximation. However, since the hazard rate
h(t) is time variant, the unavailability should be calculated
through times of break-in as well as wear-out. Generally, data
are not available to give a good description of the hazard rate
through a component's lifetime. Also, it has been demonstrated
21
that for most components, there is a long period of useful
life wherein the hazard rate is relatively constant. Under these
assumptions, Eq. (2.3.1) can be approximated as
T (t) = 1-exp[-Xt] (2.3.2)
where X is the constant component failure rate which is a
characteristic of the exponential distribution. We will see later
in Section 2.'4 that for a special case, class 3 components can
be reduced to class 2 and therefore Eq. (2.3.2) should be
obtainable from class 3 unavailability equations. Equation (2.3.2)
has been adopted in PL-MODT to calculate the unavailability of
non-repairable components.
2.4 Class 3 Components: Repairable Components
For this class of components, it is assumed again that
A(t)=A (t). For calculating K (t) it would be more convenient
to use a Markovian approach by using a constant failure rate
X(hr 1) and a constant repair rate y(hr~ ). Figure 2.4.1 presents
a Markovian model for this class of components
UP DOWN
STATE STATE
Figure 2.4.1 A Markovian model for repairable components
(revealed faults)
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It is assumed that the transition rates A and y have a
probability density function f(t) and g(t),respectively. Assuming
that state 1 is the UP state, and state 2 is the DOWN state, then
P1 2 ( T) = probability that the component K goes from 1 to 2
in the time interval At(t to t + At).
Therefore
P12 = XAt + O(At + .... ) (2.4.1)
higher order terms
Similarly, P2 1 = PAt (2.4.2)
Using Eqs. (2.4.1) and (2.4.2) we can determine the transition
matrix A as follows:
1 2
1 /-xAt XAt
P (2.4.3)
2 t
By subtracting 1 from the diagonal elements of the matrix P
one is able to find the identity matrix.
1 2
1 (-xAt XAt
P = (2.4.4)
2 yiAt -
From the identity matrix P we get the transition matrix which
reads
A (2.4.5)2)-
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To evaluate P2 (t) = K v(t) the Laplace transform is applied.
(SI - A)
S+X -X
=(-y S+yP
(2.4.6)
The inverse of the matrix, Eq. (2.4.6), is calculated as
follows
(SI-A) -=
S(S+X+p)
S1
S(S++y)+
S(S+X+p)
S+X
S(S+x+y)
y Ay
_ A +
+ 1S+X+pi (2.4.7)
/,y
Taking the inverse of Eq. (2.4.7) we can evaluate Kv (t)
-(x+y)t
P(t)= + e
_PL A
A+yi A+y
X
~_kt i
Azy
(2.4.8)
A+y
From Eq. (2.4.8) it follows that
K (t) = P (t) -XA (1-e-(X+y)t)
v 2 - - +y
Equation (2.4.9) approaches an asymptotic value of
T (t) = X
v X+y
(2.4.9)
(2.4.10)
as the time t gets large.
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Equation (2.4.10) could be reformulated as follows:
Tr
v +T r
(2.4.11)
0 = -=mean time between failures (MTBF)
and T - - mean time to repair (MTTR)
Sometimes Eq. (2.4.10) is given in the following form:
(2.4.12)K = r+1
r
Equation (2.4.9) can be used to determine unavailability of
non-repairable components. It is known that for non-repairable
components the repair rate is zero because no repair is.conducted
which corresponds to Tr= c. Therefore, by setting y=0 in
Eq. (2.4.9), it reduces to the form given by Eq. (2.3.2), i.e.,
A (t)=l-e-t
v
Equation (2.4.9) is used in the code PL-MODT to determine the
unavailability of components and some simple modules created
during the fault tree modularization.
2.5 Class 4 Components: Periodically Tested Components
Suppose that the component k is inspected at the times ti,
t2,...,tn. If k is found to be failed, it will therefore be
repaired.
e = time needed to inspect an intact component at the
n-th inspection.
T = time needed to repair a failed component at the n-th
n inspection; and
where
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n + Tn= time needed to inspect
n-th inspection.
In that case,
on +T <tn+1 
- tn
a failed component
Assuming that the times tn are known (inspection times),
unavailability for any time t given tn < t < tn+1
If
X tn 
-t n-1
- T
ny n Xn
x =1
-
0n-1
- 1
for n>l
could be
then the
calculated.
and
Then, the unavailability at different times t. would be
v (t1 )= F(x1 )
Tv(t2) + F(x1)F(y2)+[l-F(x1)]F(x2)
Tv(t 3) {F(x2)-[F(x 2 )-F(y 2 )]F(xl)} F
{l-F(x2)+[F(x 2 )-F(y2) ]F(x 1 )}
F(x2 )-[F(x 2 )-F(y 2) ]F(x 1
(y3 ) +
F(x 3) =
= F(x3)-[F(x3 )-F(y 3 )F(x 2 )+[F(x 3 )-F(y3)][F(x2)-F(y2)]F(x1 )
n .jn
I (-l)n-JF(x.) H [F(x )-F(y )]
j=l i k=j+l k k
Equation (2.5.1) can be considerably simplified, and in the
particular case of equal inspection time and inspection period,
at the
)
T (t ) (2.5.1)
,- t2,...,tn
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that is:
Inspection interval = t2 - t =
t3 -- t2 = . -
Inspection period
(Duration)
Repair period
(Duration)
Equation
e1  2
T =C =1 2
(2.5.1) becomes
= F(n-6)
n
j=1
n-j
[F(n-e-t)-F(n-e)] + [F(t )-F(n-e)]
Equation (2.5.2) can be written as follows:
K (t ) = F(n-)l[F(n)F(n-T)]
v n l+F(n-)-F(n-e-T) +
[F(t1 )-F(fl-6)][F(nl-6-T)-F(fl-6)]n-1i
Since F(n-6)-F(n-6-T) in Eq. (2.5.3) is usually very small,
Eq. (2.5.3) can be approximated by
lim K(t ) - F(TI-e )
nlim Kv n l+F(n-e)-F(n-6-T)
To calculate the unavailability as a function of
apply the theorems of the sum of the probabilities and of the
conditional probability. Therefore one can write
y (t) = T (t n) S (tn ,t)
- tn-1 =11
n
T =
n
6
T
K (tn)
(2.5.2)
( 2..5.3)
then
(2.5.4)
time, we can
=tn
[F(n-6-t)-F(n-6) ]n-1
+ [1-T (t n)]a (t , t) (2.5.5)
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a(tn ,t )
n
(n 't
= probability that the component k is down at
time t given k was up at t and,
= probability that component k is down at time t
given k was down at t.
n
Therefore,
a(tn It) = 1(t-t n) -(t-t n- 6n) + F(t-t n~ 6n)
S(t nt) = l(t-tn)-l(t-tn-en 
-Tn)+F(t-t n-n-Tn
1(t-tn)
1 1
(2.5.6)
(2.5.7)
is a unit step function given as follows:
for x>0+
for x<0_
Now if F(t) = 1-exp[-At] where X is the constant failure rate
of the component, after some approximations [2] we obtain
A t) = 1-e-(t-mn)Xeff l-(t-mg)q (2.5.8)
e
Xeff = -+2-_+ ) 1 2
p() 1q n
( ) = gamma function of 1 and,
q q
q = L n(3-L n e) and,
(2.5.9)
(2.5.10)
m=l1, 2,... ,n
Figure 2.5.1 shows the unavailability calculated by Eq. (2.5.8)
for one inspection interval and the following data for a specific
periodically tested component
6 = 1.5 hrs, T= 19 hrs, n = 720 hrs, x = 3x10 hr~1
where
and
where
wher
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z
0-4
10-
I-5. UNAVAILABILITY WITHOUT
OVERRIDE PROBABILITY
( i.e.,q go=l)
- - - - - UNAVAILABILITY WITH
OVERRIDE PROBABILITY
( i.e., go= 0.6)
I 1 1 1 1 i
0.1 0.5 I 10 100 100
HOURS
FIGURE 2.5.1
UNAVAILABILITY OF A COMPONENT AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
USING EQ. (2.5.8)
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It should be noted here that Eq. (2.5.8) can be put into a
simpler form. For instance, take
(t-mn q[1 - e 6 ] part of Equation (2.5.8)
For typical values of q, n, and 0, this part of the equation
approaches one about the end of the inspection period (i.e., for
t>mn+6). This results, howeverin an unavailability equation as
follows
A (t) = 1-e-(t-mn)Xeff
Therefore, if this approximation is used for the operating times
t>mn+e, some computing time can be saved. Thus, for only a
small fraction of time e, the complete Eq. (2.5.8) will be used
whereas for the rest of the test interval the simplified form
can be applied. (Note 6 is always in the order of a few hours and
n is in the order of several days or even a few months.) The
simplified form of Eq. (2.5.8) is not incorporated into PL-MODT
yet, but it is recommended to use this equation instead of
Eq. (2.5.8) for t>mn+6 in the future.
Equation (2.5.8) provides the unavailability of a periodically
tested component with equal test intervals. It is known, however,
that most of the time the first test interval is longer than the
subsequent ones and, therefore, Eq. (2.5.8) is not quite adequate
for this interval. Eq. (2.5.8) must be modified such that the
longer test interval can be handled. Specifically at t=O we have
Sv(O)0=O and n= n for the first test interval, with n2 3=* ' n
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for subsequent ones. A new form of Eq. (2.5.8) is actually utilized
in the PL-MODT code for the first test interval by changing
t-t+6 and setting m=l, and ri=n . Therefore, Eq. (2.5.8) becomes
t-n+1
v (t) = 1-e-(t+6-l )Xeff ( + 1 )] (2.5.11)(t - l-e (2
Also, it should be noticed that in the PL-MODT the second term
in Eq. (2.5.9) is approximated as follows
2[1- ]e/n2 = 0.2 x 6/n2  (2.5.12)
This approximation will save substantial amounts of computation
time and will not change the computed unavailabilities since
/n2 is small compared to the first term of Eq. (2.5.9).
Override probability* P can be accounted for in Eq. (2.5.8)
by simple multiplying v(t) during the inspection period (6) by
the override probability P. Therefore,
Tv (t) = Tv (t) . P (2.5.13)
where P is given by
P = q0 + (1-q )(1-e (2.5.14)
and q= override unavailability.
Eq. (2.5.14) can be derived by using Eq. (2.5.8) to calculate
the unavailability at the end of the test interval. The effect of
*Override unavailabil-ity is the probability that a component cannot
function properly during its inspection period if it is demanded.
Therefore, with an override unavailability equal to one, the component
is totally unavailable during the inspection interval.
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incorporating an override probability is also shown in Figure 2.5.1
for q =0. 6 . The overall effect is a reduction in the average
unavailability of the component and thus an increase in the system
availability.
2.6 General Time Dependent Relations for the Evaluation of Fault
Trees by Using the Modular Concept
Take a module with a set {m 1, m2 , ... , m}.
function for this module will be
a M2(t) = m[1(t), y2(t),...,m(t)]
where
The structure
(2.6.1)
a i(t) = ami(t) (1 = 1, 2,...,n) also,
1 when module i has occurred at time t
0 otherwise
The expectation value of Eq. (2.6.1) is as follows
ha(t) = E a M(t)} (2.6.2)
Similar to the steady state analysis, for a simple AND gate
module in which M = {MM 2,...,M n, Q} we have
n
h (t) = E{aM(t)} = h (t)-h (t)...h (t) = h h (t)
12 m i=l i
(2.6.3)
Similar expressions can be derived for an OR gate module,
namely for a set M
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M = {M M2, ... Mn'U
n
h (t) = 1-[1-h (t)]a ... (1-h n h i(t) (2.6.4)
1 2 n i=1
For higher order modules, we have the following relationship
aM(t) =
Nk
H T ai(t)j=1 iek (2.6.5)
where N k=number of modules and components connected to a higher
order module or the top event.
Using the minimal cut-set upper bound formula, one obtains
I
Nk
h (t) ,=ll iT
j=l ick.
h (t)
Nk
jTTjl Ek.
which is simply the union of modules and components which are
attached to a higher order module or the top event.
2.7 General Relations for Time Dependent Simple Modules Consisting
of Only Repairable Components (Class 3 Components)
The unavailability of a repairable component as given by
Eqs. (2.4.9) and (2.4.10) can be used to derive an approximate
failure rate A and a mean dead time T for simple AND and OR gates.
A simple AND gate or module is a module consisting of only
simple component inputs. From Eq. (2.4.10) by employing the common
assumption that X T <<l, one obtains
(t) = FiQiF1X (2.7.1)
where
H.(t) = unavailability of the component i input to a module,
h (t)
i.
(2.6.7)
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Once these basic relationships have been established, the
next step is to find the failure and repair rates of the module.
The primary event in an AND module can occur in the time
interval t to t+dt, with the remaining events having already
occured at time t, or the second primary event can occur in the
time interval t to t+dt, with the remaining events having already
occured at time t, or.... Keeping these observations in mind,
the following equation is obtained
n n
f(t) = pr{F IR} = 1 F.(t)A 1.dt]]~F.(t) (2.7.2)
J=l j i=1 1
ihj
where n = number of components input to the AND gate
F(t) = l-F(t)
f(t) = probability density function (p.d.f.) of an AND gate.
The p.d.f. can also be obtained as follows: If a cumulative
probability density function (c.p.d.f.) for an AND gate is designated
as f(t), then
n
H(t) =f]~.(t) (2.7.3)
i=l
By substituting Eq. (2.7.3) into Eq.(2.7.2), the following expression
results
n H(t)
f(t) = F.(t)X. x (2.7.4)
j=1 (t)
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Since F.(t) is close to unity and the remaining terms are very
small, Eq. (2.7.4) can be approximated as
n
f(t) < i9(t) Iko J=1 F .*(t)
By substituting Eqs. (2.7.1) and (2.7.3) into Eq. (2.7.5),
the following result is obtained:
n n
f(t) = f = TTXiTi (
i=l j=1 j
By using the general hazard rate formula, it is possible to
calculate A for the AND gate as
A(t) = f(t)
where
2.7.6)
2.7.7)
R(t) = reliability of the AND gate.
R(t) may be approximated by R(t)~l since the numerator is small.
Therefore, Eq. (2.7.7) reduces to the following form AAND(t)=f(t)
or, from Eq. (2.7.6),
nI
AAND TT Xi 1
i=1 i=1l
(2.7.8)
Similarly, by using the definition of the mean dead time for
a simple gate, it follows that
T(t) = (t) (2.7.9)T~t) H(t) A(t)
(2.7.5)
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Therefore, the mean dead time for a simple AND gate can be obtained
from the definition in Eq. (2.7.9)-
n
11F1 XiTi
TANDn n n n (2.7.10)
(1 -TT )(TT.T )
i=1 i=1 j=1 j
n
Since X T <<1, it can be assumed that (1-TTX T )~l and thus
i=1
Eq. (2.7.10) can be written as follows
TAND= n (2.7.11)
j=1 j
In a similar way, one can obtain the value of A(t) and T(t)
for OR gates. The first primary event in an OR gate can occur in
the time interval t to t+dt with the remaining events not having
occurredat time tor the second primary event can occur in the
time interval t to t+dt with the remaining events not having
occurred at time t or,....
-Similar to Eq. (2.7.2), the following equation results.
n n
g(t).dt = IG(t)X dt 1TG (t) (2.7.12)
j=1 1" i=l
i*j
Applying the same approximations made for Eq. (2.7.2), Eq.
(2.7.12) can be reduced to the following form
n
g(t) = L(t) X. (2.7.13)
j=1 j
where n n
L(t) = TTG (t)~l- 3(t)
1=1 l
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From Equation (2.7.13) it follows that
n n
AOR g i i
Using a definitiont similar to that in Eq. (2.7.9) for the
dead time,
T(t) = L ( t)
n n
(2.7.14)
By approximating H Xi as X A T,, then TOR follows as
T OR i=l
Xi i
(2.7.15)n 2 n2
X1 A T
j=1 =
A special case in which (1-
n 2
AkiT1 ) is close to unity1=
would result in very simple forms for A OR and TOR, namely,
n
AOR X ii=1
n n
TOR= AT /
i=1l=
X i
The values obtained for A and T for
(2.7.16)
(2.7.17)
simple AND and OR
modules can be further investigated. For example, take Eqs. (2.7.8)
and (2.7.11) for an AND module. If we were to approximate this
module behaving as a simple component, with the same approximation
stated in Eq. (2.7.1), it follows that the unavailability of the
module is given by
and
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n
A AND = AAND ' AND i i (2.7.18)
Equation (2.7.18) can also be obtained by using the asymptotic
unavailabilities of individual input components to this AND gate.
Similarly, from Eqs. (2.7.16) and (2.7.17) it follows that
n
A OR = AOR ' TOR xi ( 2.7.19)
which is again the exact asymptotic unavailability of this OR
module.
Equations (2.7.18) and (2.7.19) show that the approximation
of assuming that a simple module behaves as a simple component
would have no effect whatsoever on the simple module's asymptotic
unavailability, if and only if A .T << 1.
The above discussion indicates that within a certain range of
time, Eq. (2.4.9) could be used to determine the unavailability of
the module. By examining many typical simple modules, it has been
found that the approximation of assuming that modules would behave
as components will not provide an adequate value for the unavaila-
bility of the module for times t < 2T. Figure 2.7.1 shows a
comparison between the exact unavailability of a typical simple AND
module with two input components; Table 2.7.1 summarizes the
parametric characteristics of these input components.
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Table 2.7.1
Component Input
Input Component
2
to a Simple AND Module
Failure Rate (hr~ )
3 x 10~4
2 x 10-5
Mean Dead Time (hr)
100
150
Therefore,
A 9 x 10-5 x 1 1.5 x 10-6 hr-l
AAND=xO x l. x 0 h
1
TAND 1 1 60 hrs
100 150
2.8 General Relationships for a Time-Dependent Simple Module
Consisting of Only Non-Repairable Components (Class 2 Components)
For a non-repairable component, the unavailability is given
by Eq. (2.3.2). For a simple component i, the unavailability
would be
(2.8.1)F (t) = 1 - e
For small values of X t we can approximate Eq. (2.8.1) as
Fi(t) ~ A .t. Therefore, by using Eq. (2.6.3) one obtains under
these circumstances
n
AAND (t) = (T )tn-1
i=1
(2.8.2)
where n = number of inputs to the AND gate. For the case of an
I.0x10 4
-5
I.OxIO
5x10-6
1X1
6
mol- 00- -
APPROXIMATION
IS NOT VALID
100 200
APPROXIMATION
IS VALID
300
TIME (HOURS)
FIGURE 2.7.1
UNAVAILABILITY OF AN AND MODULE AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
00
6~;
I
-. 0 Wmm =
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OR gate, AOR is derived by using Eq. (2.6.4)
n
AOR 1 (2.8.3)
i=l
Treating an OR module as a simple 6omponent will result in
exactly the same unavailabilities and no approximation is involved
by using Eq. (2.8.3). Treating an AND gate as a simple component
by using Eq. (2.8.2) is possible only if X t is small, namely,
X t<0.1. In that case, Eq. (2.8.2) provides the failure rate of
a simple AND module. Therefore, for t>0.1/Xi the approximation is
no longer valid and the general equation
n
A(t) = TT Fi(t) must be used.
i=l
Table 2.8.1 summarizes the formulas discussed in this section.
2.9 Description of the PL-MODT Code
The original PL-MOD code consists of only Class 1 components,
and therefore it is only able to evaluate time-independent components.
The other three classes of components have been incorporated into the
PL-MOD code, and thus the extended version is called PL-MODT, which
also comprises all the other features of the PL-MOD code. The
incorporation of Class 2,3, and 4 components is performed in five
separate steps.
Step 1 includes the development of subroutine SHOHREH, which
evaluates time-dependent unavailability of fault trees consisting
of only non-repairable components (Class 2 components).
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Table 2.8.1
Failure Characteristics of Simple Modules
Having Repairable or Non-repairable Component Inputs
Repairable Components'
T
Non-repairable
Components
A
(n n(=1  i1 i1
n
m* k k 1
n
i=1l
n
Ix i 
n
i= 1
m k
k=l i=l IT -
m k 1 i l iiii~ m -I I Ti
k=1 i= i=l i
* m = kCN k!(N-k)!
Type of
Module
A
( n
i=lAND
OR
K-0-N
n
A
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Step 2 includes the development of subroutine CECA which
evaluates time-dependent unavailability of fault trees consisting
of only repairable components (Class 3 components).
Step 3 includes-the development of subroutine SHARAREH which
evaluates time-dependent unavailability of fault trees consisting
of only periodically tested components (Class 4 components).
Step 4 consists of a further development of the old NUMERO
subroutine to enable it to calculate the average unavailability over
the period of system operation. In addition, the old subroutines
PLUS and EXPECT were modified to allow the code the treatment of
unavailabilities which are close to one. This seems necessary for
Class 4 components during the component inspection period, where
unavailabilities are usually close to 1.
Step 5 comprises the development of the SHARAREH subroutine
such that the PL-MODT code contains the ability to handle large
fault trees consisting of a combination of different classes of
components with different time-dependent behaviors.
These five steps are discussed in full detail in the following
sections.
2.9.1 Developments Included in Step 1
In the SHOHREH procedure, the value of the unavailability for
simple AND modules is calculated at different time steps
(DEL9T(1,j)) by using Eqs. (2.8.2) and (2.3.2) up to a time t
where t=0.1/X and X is the largest failure rate of the components
on the module. After the time t, the components are considered
individually and therefore only Eq. (2.3.2) is used.
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For the simple OR modules, the unavailability is calculated
by using Eqs. (2.8.3) and (2.3.2). No limitation exists for the
OR module and thus Eqs. (2.8.2) and (2-3.2) are used for the entire
operational period.
The total number of time steps in each time interval mesh is
calculated by
TIE(lI) = AUN(1,I)
* DEL9T(1,I)'
where AUN(l,I) is the duration in which the time step
DELqT(1,I) is applied and,
DEL9T(1,I) is the time step for the I-th mesh interval.
At each TIE(1,I) time step, first the unavailability values
are calculated for the various modules and components of the
fault tree using Eq. (2.3.2). Next, these unavailabilities are
assigned to the arrays STATE(l,I) and STATD(l,I). Finally, the
subroutines EXPECT, DOT, PLUS, MINUP, and IMPORTANCE are called
respectively to calculate the top event and higher order module's
unavailability as well as the Vesely-Fussell importance measures.
The same procedure is applied for all of the other time interval
meshes (AUN(1,l), AUN(l,2),...,AUN(l,N)). At the end, the mean
N
unavailability is calculated when the time exceeds T= Z AUN(1,I)
I=1
and the program stops.
As explained before, for each time interval mesh there exists
a corresponding time step DEL9T(l,I) and, therefore, a corresponding
number of time steps TIE(l,I). Thus, the total number of
unavailability values calculated for the top event would be
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N
TIE = X TIE(lI)
I=1
where N = total number of time interval meshes used.
2.9.2 Developments Included in Step 2
In the second step, the CECA subroutine was developed. Similar
to the SHOHREH subroutine, different time interval meshes along
with their corresponding time steps are used. These values are
stored in the allocated arrays AUN(l,I) and DEL9T(1,I). Four
other arrays--STSTS, STATT, STATTE, and STATED--are allocated to
store the failure and repair rates of free and replicated
components, respectively.
At the beginning of the operation, the approximations
discussed in Section 2.8 of this chapter are not applicable due
to the small unavailability values and, therefore, the unavailabilities
of replicated and free components must be calculated directly by
using Eq. (2.4.9). As time progresses the components approach
their asymptotic unavailability values and, therefore, when the
unavailability errors are small enough (usually when t~3T), the
code automatically uses the approximations summarized in Table 2.8.1.
As discussed before, these formulas asymptotically approach the
exact unavailability for simple modules..
Unavailability values calculated at each time step will be again
assigned to the STATE (1,I) and STATD(l,I) arrays. After calling
subroutines EXPECT, DOT, PLUS, MINUP and IMPORTANCE, the top event
and higher order module's unavailability will be calculated. When
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no time interval meshes remain, the average unavailability will be
determined by using the procedure incorporated into the NUMERO
subroutine. This will be discussed in Section 2.9.4.
2.9.3 Developments Included in Step 3
In this step, the SHARAREH subroutine is developed for
periodically tested components. In this subroutine the use of
different mesh intervals plays an important role in the
accurate determination of the top event unavailability. For
example, during the inspection period, very small time step meshes
must be used in order to calculate the detailed behavior of the
system within this interval, which usually results in large system
unavailabilities during this short time interval. (See examples
presented in Section 2.10.)
The arrays STATT and STATD are allocated to store the failure
rates of free and replicated components respectively. The arrays
ETTA and ETTAD are used to store the test interval, TTETA and
TTETAD to store the inspection period, whereas TAVV and TAVVD are
employed to store the repair duration.
The values of eff and q from Eqs. (2.5.9) and (2.5.10) are
calculated for each free and replicated component and are stored in
the arrays STATTE and STATTED, QUUE and QUUED, respectively for
free and replicated components. At each time step, a special
procedure is employed to determine the value of m in Eq. (2.5.8).
This value provides the specific test interval that should be
used. For m=1, the code will use Eq. (2.5.11), since it indicates
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that the component is in its first test interval. For m>l,
Eq. (2.5.8) will be used under the assumption that the subsequent
test intervals are identical (i.e., only the first test interval
differs from the others).
The unavailabilities calculated at each time step are assigned
to the arrays STATE(lI) and STATD(1,I) in order to calculate
the top and higher order module unavailabilities. For periodically
tested components, no approximations such as those discussed in
Section 2.7 can be applied, since it seems that no correlation
exists between a simple module inspection and repair duration
and its input components' parameters (i.e., , 0, T, and X).
Finally, the average unavailability during each test interval
is calculated in the NUMERO procedure. If the override unavaila-
bility has a value less than unity, and if the time step is within
the inspection period of the component, then the value of the
predicted unavailability will be multiplied by a value called
POORD, where POORD is the override probability.
POORD = q + (1 - q0 )(1 - e~ eff ' )
q = override unavailability
Therefore, the arrays STATE(lI) and STATD(l,I) will change to the
following form.
STATE(l,I) = POORD * STATE(lI) and
STATD(1,I) = POORD * STATD(1,I)
where STATE(l,I) and STATD(1,I) are calculated by Eq. (2.5.8).
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2.9.4 Developments Included in Step 4
In the fourth step, the NUMERO subroutine is further
extended to calculate the average unavailability of the top
event. For this purpose, the following assumption is made.
After the unavailabilities of two successive time steps are found
for the top event, it is assumed that the unavailability changes
linearly between these two points. Therefore, the unavailability
as a function of time for the top event of a specific fault tree
can be calculated for different time steps by the PL-MODT. For
the special case of a fault tree of only periodically tested
components, the top event unavailability behaves as shown in
Figure 2.9.1.
Figure 2.9.1: Unavailability as a Function of Time
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The total area under the curve in Figure 2.9.1 is calculated by
adding the area occupied by each time step interval, and using the
linear unavailability approximation between the two time steps.
The total area is then divided by the operating time t, where
N
T= I AUN(l,I) to get the average unavailability of the system.
i=l
In the PL-MOD version of the code, the approximation states
in Eq. (2.6.7) is used to calculate the union of all components and
modules attached to a higher order module or the top event.. In
the time-dependent version of the code, this approximation is no
longer appropriate, since sometimes we are dealing with unavaila-
bilities ranging from 0.2 to 1, which precludes the use of the
minimal cut-set upper bound formula, Eq. (2.6.7). Thus, the
general form N
h (t) = TT hr.(t)
j=1 isk. i
is incorporated into the subroutines PLUS and MINUP. However,
if the unavailabilities input to a higher order module or the top
event are individually smaller than 0.2, then the program is
constructed such that the old versions of subroutines PLUS and
MINUP are used. As an example, part of the changes stated
above are presented here.
IF REX<0.2 THEN GO TO ZACH;
(NOTE: ZACH will follow the old PLUS subroutine, and REX
is unavailability calculated for the module.)
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IF (PROP.LIM=l e PROP.TIL(l)=0) THEN GO TO SLUA;
DO J=l TO PROP. LIM;
REX=REX*(l-STATE(L,PROP.TIL(J)));
END;
SLUA: IF (PROP.MIM=l e PROP.PIM(1)=NULL) THEN GO TO SLUB;
DO J=1 TO PROP.MIM;
IF (PROP.PIM(J)-+-PROP.HOST, =NULL) THEN DO;
PR=PROP.PIM(J)->-PROP.HOST;
REX=REX*(l-PER.REL(l));
END;
ELSE REX=REX*(l-PROP.PIM(J)+i-PROP.REL(l));
END;
SLUB: REX=1-REX;
ZACH: .....
The dummy variable REX and other similar variables are
declared on FLOAT DECIMAL (16) so that the result from subtraction
of small unavailabilities from 1 will not be truncated.
2.9.5 Developments Included in Step 5
In the last step, the SHARAREH subroutine is further developed
in order to combine different classes of time-dependent components.
This enables the code to treat any combination of repairable, non-
repairable and periodically tested components in a fault tree.
This specific problem is solved by adding a zero test interval
condition option for those components which are not periodically
tested (i.e., ETTA(l,I)=ETTAD(l,I)=0). If the zero test interval
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condition arises, then the computer code will automatically apply
Eq. (2.4.9) and thus will not evaluate Eqs. (2.5.8) through
(2.5.11).
It should be noted here that in the case of non-repairable
components, Eq. (2.4.9) reduces to Eq. (2.3.2) with the repair
rate equal to zero (i.e., y= 0). Therefore, for a non-repairable
component we have ETTA(l,I) =ETTAD(1,I)=TTETA(1,I)=TTETAD(1,I)=0.
This results in an equation of the form given by Eq. (2.3.2).
One final note discusses the usefulness of the subroutines
SHOHREH and CECA. Since the SHARAREH subroutine can handle not
only periodically tested components but also repairable (revealed
fault) and non-repairable compoennts, then there is seemingly no
need for the subroutines SHOHREH and CECA. However, it should be
pointed out here that the use of SHOHREH and CECA subroutines
saves computation time due to approximation incorporated into them.
Additionally, no procedure exists in these subroutines which would
recognize the class of each component at each individual time step.
Furthermore, if the fault tree components are only of one class,
then the corresponding subroutine should be used to save
computation time, although the unavailabilities will naturally be
the same by using the SHARAREH subroutine. A variable ESF is
used in the PL-MODT code to determine which subroutine is going
to be used. For ESF=1, all components are considered to have
steady-state point value unavailability (i.e., Class 1 components).
For ESF=2,all components are considered to be repairable (revealed
fault) components (i.e., Class 3 components). Finally, for ESF=4
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all components are periodically tested components (i.e., Class 4
components) or a combination of the above-mentioned classes of
components.
2.10 Examples
In order to more easily comprehend the meaning of the input
description, four examples are given in this section.
2.10.1 Low Pressure Recirculation System (LPRS)
for PWRs (Class 1)
This system is part of the Emergency Core Cooling Recircula-
tion System and consists of the containment pump and two pumps in
parallel redundancy. Figure 2.10.1 shows a simplified flow
diagram and Figure 2.10.2 shows its associated reduced fault tree.
It should be referred to in connection with the following discussion.
All values with the exception of V24 and V25 are aligned for
injection into the cold legs. V2 4 and/or V25 should be open in
order to start the LPRS and close V 2. These valves, whether
locally or remotely operated, are all manually operated. Details
of the system as well as its fault tree can be taken from
WASH-1400 [3].
The LPRS unavailability estimates are given in WASH-1400 as
follows:
QWASH 1.3 x 10-2
med
QWASH 4.4 x 10-3lower
Q WASH= 2.7 x 10-2upper
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Figure 2.10.1: Simplified Flow Diagram LPRS
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where the lower and upper bounds were evaluated by a Monte-Carlo
simulation by using the minimal cut-set approach. The point
estimates for single and double failures, test and maintenance
as well as common mode failures are:
Qsingle = 1.1 x 10-5
Qdouble = 2.7 x 10-3-
Qtest & main = 1.0 x 10~
Qcommon = 6.0 x 10-3
respectively.
This system has been analyzed by PL-MOD to determine the
point estimate probability for the occurrence of the top event
and the Vesely-Fussell importance of the components. The reduced
fault tree contains a total of 61 non-replicated basic events,
4 replicated events and 2 replicated modular gates.
The point unavailability computed by PL-MOD using the
modular approach is
Q = 4.83 x 10-3
The total computation time for this example was 0.46 sec.
and included the modularization, the evaluation of the top event
probability and the determination of the importance measure for
all components and modules in the fault tree.
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2.10.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System - A Comparison Between
PL-MODT and FRANTIC (Class 4)
The Aux-Feed System is shown in Figure 2.10.3 and described
in detail in [4]. As can be seen from the figure, the system
consists of two diesels in parallel with a pump and two valves.
The pump and valves are in series. The block diagram used in
FRANTIC.[4] is a simplified version of the one shown in WASH-1400.
It is assumed that the components of the system are periodically
tested. The data are summarized in Table 2.10.1.
Figure 2.10.4 compares the results for the point unavail-
ability computed by the two codes FRANTIC and PL-MODT. It should
be noticed that PL-MODT gives slightly lower values for the
unavailability for the system during the operation time. During
the inspection time of valve 1, pump and valve 2, and diesel 4
(720 < t < 721.5) both codes give essentially the same answer.
However, for the repair time interval, a larger difference appears
as can be seen from Figure 2.10.5. This is mainly due to the
fact that the analytical equation in PL-MODT gives lower values
for the unavailability. This difference vanishes as the end of
the inspection period is approached. Thereafter, both codes
predict about the same value for the unavailability as depicted
in Figure 2.10.5. To evaluate unavailabilities shown in Figure
2.10.5, a finer time step mesh was used.
PL-MODT treats the group: valve 1, pump and valve 2, as
a module and therefore the unavailability of this module will be
given automatically in the output. Therefore, the unavailability
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Figure 2.10.3
Block Diagram of the Aux-Feed System
Valve Pump Valve
TABLE 2.10.1
THE COMPONENT INPUT DATA FOR THE.CODES FRANTIC AND PL-MODT
Component
Number
Component name
Valve
Valve2
3
4
5
Pump
Diesel
Diesel
Failure
Ratei
(x10 )
0.3
0.3
3
42
42
Test
Interval
(days)
(n)
30
30
30
60
60
First Test
Interval
q.T. '
30
30
30
30
60
Inspection
Duratior'6,)
(hours)
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
Repa-1r
Dura-
tion(n)
(hours)
7
7
19
21
21,
(q )
Ovgrride
Unavail-
ability
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0 "D
60
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for each branch could automatically be obtained from the same
computer run for unavailability calculations of the top event.
The CPU time for PL-MODT was 0.57 seconds for modularizing
the fault tree and calculating the unavailabilities for 40 time
steps as well as the importances for components and modules.
As the number of components increases and more inspected
components become involved, the differences during the repair
time should vanish. This will become more apparent in the next
example.
2.10.3 Example of a Simple Electric Circuit Using FRANTIC
and PL-MODT
Figure 2.10.6 shows a simple electric system which has been
discussed in [5]. The purpose of the system is to provide light
by the bulb when the switch is closed, the relay 1 contacts
closed and the contacts of relay 2 ( a normally closed relay) are
opened. Should the contacts of relay 1 open, the light will go
out and the operator will immediately open the switch which in
turn causes the contacts of the relay 2 to close which restores
the light. In what follows, operator failures, wiring failures
as well as secondary failures will be neglected. The fault tree
for this system is shown in Figure 2.10.7.
Failure rates, repair times and test periods for the various
components are summarized in Table 2.10.2. N1o replicated
component or module exists in this system.
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8
Figure 2.10.7 :
9 10
Fault Tree for Sample System in Figure 2.10. 6
TABLE 2.10.2
INSPECTION PARAMETERS FOR THE CIRCUIT EXAMPLE
Component #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Failure
rat
2.0x10 4
2.8x10-5
2.8x10-5
3.2x10- 3
4.1x10~4
3.2x10~4
2.8x10-3
2.8x10- 3
4.5x10-3
Inspection
Time (hrs)
. 1.0
0.5
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
0.5
1.0
0.5
First (Days)
Time Inter-
val
7
7
7
7
14
28
14
14
7
Repair
Time (hrs)
2.0
1.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.5
Override-
Unavail-
ability
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
Test 1(days)
Interval
7
14
7
21
28
21
14
7
1.5 7 3.010 4 .5x10- 3 1.0 7
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In order to enable FRANTIC to analyze this system, the
system's unavailability function must be provided as input.
This function was found to be
QS= { 1. 0-,(1-Q(l) ) {'1-[ (1-Q(2) )(1-Q(4) )(1-Q(7) )(1-Q(8))
*(l-Q(9))(l-Q(10))][l-(1-Q(3))(l-Q(6))(l-Q(5))}}
Naturally, for PL-MODT the fault tree was directly inputted
because there is no need for a system function. As output,
PL-MODT gives the four following modules.
Module'#4: components 5, 6, and 3
Module #3: components 4, 7, 8, 9, 10,. and 2
Module #2: modules 4 and 3
Module #1: component 1 and module 2
Figure 2.10.8 compares the output of both codes for one complete
period of 28 days. As can be seen, the results are overall in
very close agreement during the operational period. Differences are
attributed to the fact that for this example the failure rates
are comparatively highand the FRANTIC prediction,by using a linear
approximation for the unavailability, at large times would not
be valid.
Again, during the inspection period both codes give essentially
the same results. However, for the repair period (see Figure
2.10.9) differences show up again which were observed already in
Example 2.10.2. It should be noticed that these differences are
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28
DAYS
Figure 2.10.8: Comparison Between the Unavailabilities for the Electrical System
During Its Operation as Calculated by FRANTIC and PL-MODT
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not as pronounced as in Example 2.10.2 because more components
are involved in the present example.
The CPU time for PL-MODT was 0.98 seconds for modularizing
the tree, evaluating the unavailabilities for components, modules
and the top event for 32 time steps and for determining the
importances for various components and modules.
For the same tree and data, FRANTIC needed 1.12 seconds
alone for calculating the system unavailability over the period
of 180 days and to determine the mean unavailability of the
system over this period. However, it should be noted here that
PL-MODT would be an efficient and convenient code for evaluating
large fault trees consisting of periodically tested components.
Examples 2.10.2 and 2.10.3 showed that the code is also fairly
fast for evaluating small fault trees as compared to other
state-of-the-art computer codes.
2.10.4 Comments and Discussion
2.10.4.1 Differences Between FRANTIC and PL-MODT
The obvious difference between the two codes is that
whereas PL-MODT is capable of analyzing large fault trees and
evaluating them at the same time, the use of FRANTIC is mainly
confined to the analysis of small systems for which the system
unavailability function is known in advance. This off-line
approach is not only time consuming but has the additional
disadvantage that the user may introduce spurious errors.
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In case that a system, for example, the Aux-Feed system,
is to be evaluated in more detail than each valve, pump, and
diesel would be further developed down to the level of subcom-
ponents which are periodically tested. For this purpose,
PL-MODT is especially suited.
The analysis of computer storage and CPU statistics for
PL-MODT is underway.
2.10.4.2 Comments on the Vesely-Fussell Importance Measure
PL-MODT enables the user to select the option for the
determination of the V.F. importance in steady-state and transient
evaluations. As an example, Figure 2.10.10shows the importance
of the.pump in the Aux-Feed system as a function of time. The
importance stays about constant through the operational period.
After a sudden increase in system unavailability due to the
testing of the pump, the valves, and the diesel, the importance
of the pump sharply decreases and increases again, once the
inspection has been finished. Thereafter, it remains fairly
constant during repair and operation. The opposite behavior can
be seen in Figure 2.10.11 for the valves. The reason for this
behavior is that the combination of valve 1, pump and valve 2
constitutes a prime module which is directly connected to the
top event and thus its total importance is 1 over the whole
operational period. The same holds for diesels 4 and 5. As a
result, any increase in pump importance is accompanied at the
same time by a decrease in valve importance.
07,
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2.10.5 Comparison Between PL-MODT 'and PREP & KITT-1
(Class 2 and 3)
This comparison is based upon an example considered in
Ref. [6]. The associated fault tree is shown in Figure 2.10.12.
It has been analyzed and evaluated by PL-MODT for the data
summarized in Table 2.10.3 by assuming all components show a
time-dependent failure behavior but are non-repairable.
Figure 2.10.13 compares the results of the two codes. Those
for PREP & KITT are taken from [6]. For the first 3000 hrs,
PL-MODT calculates unavailabilities which are higher than those
computed by PREP & KITT. Thereafter, the trend reverses and
PREP & KITT gives higher -values. Which code comes closer to
the exact answer can only be answered by benchmarking these
codes against a code which employs the Markovian approach.
The computation time for PL-MODT was -0.64 seconds for
modularizing the tree, finding the unavailabilities for
system, components and modules for 10 time steps. Advantage
was taken of the fact that PL-MODT is capable of handling
directly K-out-of-N gates. Therefore, the two 2/3 gates were
inputted, rather than analyzed by the code. This approach
naturally saves computer storage and computation time.
The same fault tree in Figure 2.10.12 was used to evaluate
the top event unavailability for the case that components 1
to 6 in Figure 2.10.12 are repairable and 7 to 10 are
non-repairable. The following data were used (Table 2.10.4).
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FIGURE 2.10,12 -
FAULT TREE EXAMPLE GIVEN IN [6]
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TABLE 2.10.3
PRIMARY FAILURE RATES FOR SAMPLE FAULT TREE SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.10.12
Primary Failure Index )(hr
1 2.6 . 10- 6
2 2.6 . 10- 6
3 2.6 . 10-6
4 3.5 - 10-5
5 3.5 . 10-5
6 3.5 . 10-5
7 3.5 . 10-6
8 5.0 . 10-6
9 8.0 . 10-6
8.0 . 10-610
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TABLE 2.10.4
FAILURE AND REPAIR RATES FOR SAMPLE TREE IN FIGURE 2.10.12
Primary Failure Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
(hr 1 )
2.6 x 1o-6
2.6 x 10 6
2.6 x 10 6
3.5 x 10-5
3.5 x 10- 5
3.5 x 10 -5
5.0 x 10-6
5.0 x 10-6
8.0 x 1o-6
8.0 x lo-6
-(hr~)
4.1 x 1o-2
4.1 x 10- 2
4.1 x 10-2
1.66 x 101
1.66 x 10~
1.66 x 1
0
0
0
0
First PREP & KITT were used to compare its results with PL-MODT.
Next, FRANTIC results were used for the same example. The results
are shown in Figure 2.10.14
Small differences exist due to different approximations used
in these codes. However, these three codes give essentially the
same asymptotic values for unavailabilities. The job run time for
PL-MODT to calculate the top event unavailability for 15 time
steps was 0.62 seconds.
(C 
_______________
HOURS
COMPARISON OF THE TIME-DEPENDENT UNAVAILABILITIES OF
REPAIRABLE COMPONENTS FOR THE SAMPLE TREE GIVEN IN
FIGURE 2.10.12 AS CALCULATED BY FRANTIC, PREP, KITT
AND PL-MODT
78
REFERENCES
[11 J. Olmos and L. Wolf, A Modular Approach to Fault Tree
and Reliability Analysis, Department of Nuclear Engineering,
MIT, MITNE-209, August 1977.
[21 L. Caldorola, "Unavailability and Failure Intensity of
Components", Nucl. Eng. Design, 44, 147'(1977).
[3] Reactor Safety Study, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington,
Appendix II.
[4] W.E. Vesely and F.F. Goldberg, FRANTIC: A Computer Code for
Time-Dependent Unavailability Analysis, NUREG-0193,
October 1977.
[5] H.E. Lambert, Fault Trees for Decision Making in System
Analysis, UTRL-51829, October 1975.
[6] W.E. Vesely, A Time-Dependent Methodology for Fault Tree
Evaluation, Nuclear Engineering 13(1970), 337-360.
[7] M. Modarres and L. Wolf, PL-MODT: An Extended Version of
the PL-MOD Code for the Modular, Transient Fault Tree
Analysis and Evaluation, Department of Nuclear Engineering,
MIT, Internal Report.
[8] M. Modarres and L. Wolf, "PL-MODT: A Modular Fault Tree
Analysis and Transient Evaluation Code", Trans. Am. Nucl.
Soc. 28, 510 (1978).
79
3. REDUCTION OF LARGE FAULT TREES BASED ON THE
VESELY-FUSSELL IMPORTANCE MEASURES
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the fault tree reduction method which is
incorporated into the PL-MODT code is discussed. This reduction
method is based on the Vesely-Fussell importance measures which
are calculated by the code. A value called cut-off value is
inputted and any higher order module, simple module, or component
which has an importance less than this value is eliminated.
The remaining part of the original fault tree is the reduced
version. Essentially, it must have all of the characteristics
of the original fault tree. The reduced version of the tree
is very useful for further assessment of the fault tree, such
as low order cut-set generation, test and maintenance considera-
tion, common cause analysis,..., etc.. In the following
sections, some discussions are provided to clarify the method
of reduction and the cut-off range to be used.
3.2 Importance Measures and the Use of PL-MOD to Calculate
the V-F Importance Measures
The code PL-MOD is able to calculate the importance
measures for large fault trees very effectively and economically.
Olmos and Wolf [1] have developed V-F importance measures to
calculate importance of higher order modules in a fault tree.
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For example, a higher order module is shown in Figure
3.2.1. To evaluate the V-F importance of modules
the one shown in Figure 3.2.1, it follows that
NJ
l' 1 a''., n TTk=1 iki
(i=l, 2, . , n)
The probability that module
failure of its parent module am,
a will contribute
given that
to the
the parent module
has failed is given by
P(aS.k (al' 02,..., 0 )
a %0 W 0 n)
(3.2.3)1' a2,..., a n)) = ha
and Eq. (3.2.1) implies that is given by
Njk
2, 2,
the V.F. importance for module j with respect to the
top event will be
V.F.
6,a
V.F.
aM
= 1)
(3.2.5)
such as
(3.2.1)
VF
ISO
now
= 1)
= 1)
(3.2.2)
Thus,
(3.2.4)
N k
P(( HT1 ad)
k=1 kk9
jck
h
a M
aM
k{
Cut-sets
YM (Y
1
K, = (0, 0,
V.F.
Mi
VP(Ka(M))
~M h
-M h mn)
.... 0.9 00
= (0,...L..L.
HIGHER ORDER PRIME GATE SUPER-MODULEFigure3. 1:
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In the code PL-MOD the subroutine IMPORTANCE is constructed
to evaluate the Vesely-Fussell importance (I V.F. for every
modular and basic component in the fault tree. IMPORTANCE
provides these quantities by starting from the top event and
taking the top event importance to be equal to 1 (i.e.,
IV.F. = 1), and by proceeding then to higher order modules,TOP
simple modular and finally basic components of the fault tree.
For a simple AND module it follows from the foregoing that
I (i=1, 2,..., n)C.
and
IV.F. F. (i=l, 2,..., n)
For a simple OR module we have
V.F V. PI ' = I ' ' . (i=1, 2,..., n)
I ~M
I V.F. I V.F. M (i=1, 2, ... , n)
For the case of higher order modular gates, the following
equations are used in the IMPORTANCE subroutine
I P(k
IV.F. = V.F. j.,r ek 326S = (3.2.6)
r M P(Mv)
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P(k)
IV. _ = V.F. jM e kf j (3.2.7)M. =M P(M)
The numerator of Eqs. (3.2.6) and (3.2.7) is calculated
in the IMPORTANCE subroutine, whereas all other probabilities
are already calculated in the EXPECT subroutine.
The pressure tank system [1] will be analyzed here to show
the procedure for V.F. importance calculations. Figure 3.2.2
shows the pressure tank system and Figure 3.2.3 shows its
fault tree. This fault tree consists of 13 free components and
one replicated component with no replicated module. Failure
data for the fault tree in Figure 3.2.3 are given in Table 3.2.1.
The different modules which exist in the pressure tank system
fault tree are presented in Figure 3.2.3. To calculate the
importance measures, the following calculations
are performed in three steps. It should be recalled that all
probabilities are calculated in the EXPECT subroutine prior
to the use of the IMPORTANCE subroutine.
STEP 1 VF= 1TOP
IV.F. r =2.49937 x 1 01
r P(TOP)
M
IV.F. M 1 = 7.500625 x 101N 1  P(TOP)
P P
I 'V.F. IV ' = MP M5 = 4.49887 x 10-10MN M5 P(TOP)
IA'l OUTLET VALVE
RE SENSE LINE
JSE
INFINITE
RESERVOIR
TO START TANK
PRESSURE
TANK
Figure 13.2.2: -PRiSSURE TANK EXAMPLE
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MODULES IN THIS TREE
G3
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G5
G6
Figure 3.2.3:- Pressure
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TABLE 3.2.1
PRESSURE TANK RUPTURE FAULT TREE FAILURE PROBABILITY DATA
Basic Event i
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Event Description Failure Rate .
(Per Loading Cycle,
Pressure Tank Faulure
Secondary failure of Pressure Tank
Due to Improper Selection
Secondary failure of Pressure Tank
Due to out-of-tolerance conditions
K2 relay contacts fail to open
Si switch secondary failure
S1 switch contacts fail to open
External reset actuation force remains
on switch Sl
K1 relay contacts fail to open
Timer does not time-off " due to
improper setting
Timer relay contacts fail to open
Pressure switch not actuated by sensor
1
Pressure switch not actuated by sensor
2
Pressure switch not actuated by sensor
3
Replicated Event i
(3000)1
10-8
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
10-5
Event Description - Failure Rate
(Per Loading Cycle
Common Cause failure among 10-5
relays KI13K2 and timer T
V.F. V.F. 1 -4
1 =M V = 2.49937 x 10'
1 M
IV.F. V.F.2 3
V.F. = IV.F.10-5 - 2.49937 x 10~
4 M1 PM 
V.F.
M 9
V.
M4
= 4.49887 x 10-10
V.F. . F FV.F. ..F. I VF. = IV.F.
5 6 7 8 9 10
IV F.
M5
10-5 = 7.49812 x 10~
~M5
STEP 3
'= I 'V. = I. F. V.F. x 2(10-5) 2 _ 2.99924 x 10-101 11 12 13 M N9 M2.924x1
Therefore, if we were to reduce this fault tree based on
the above calculations for a cut-off value of 10~ , we should
perform the following procedure.
STEP 1
I V F. = 2.49937 x 10~ KEPT
(since larger than 10~ )
I. 'N 1
= 7.500625 x 10~ KEPT
I V.F = IV.F.M14 M 5
= 4.49887 x 10-10 CANCELED
STEP 2
.L
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Therefore, M and components 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 will be
automatically canceled
IV.F. 2.4993.7 x 10~4 KEPT1
I V' IV.F.  V.F. = 2.49937 x 10 KEPT
From this discussion, the reduced version of the fault tree
in Figure 3.2.3 is given in Figure 3.2.4. Naturally, the same
procedure is adopted to reduce large fault trees by the use of
the IMPORTANCE subroutine in the PL-MOD code. The method
applied is presented in the next section.
3.3 Use of the Code PL-MOD to Reduce Large Fault Trees
As discussed in Section 3.2, the subroutine IMPORTANCE in
PL-MOD provides the V-F importance measures for all of the fault
tree components as well as simple and higher order modules. This
subroutine is modified to a new form such that it accounts for the
cut-off value to exclude those components and modules that have
V-F importances less than this prescribed value. For any further
evaluation, the new reduced form of the fault tree could be used.
Obviously, the cut-off value plays an important role in
the reduction strategy. That is, different values of the cut-off
value result in different reduced fault trees. Therefore, a
great deal of attention must be paid to the selection of the cut-off
value in order to achieve a desired and accurate form of the
reduced fault tree.
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Figure 3.2.4
Reduced Fault Tree for the Pressure Tank Rupture for an
Importance Cut-Off Value of lx10-
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The new form of the IMPORTANCE subroutine is linked with
the code PL-MODT, so that for future developments of the code,
the reduced version of fault trees will be used by the code to
evaluate time-dependent behavior of the fault tree.
In the modified form of the IMPORTANCE subroutine, the top
event importance will be set equal to 1. Starting from the top
event it proceeds to the bottom. First, V-F importances of the
higher modules and replicated events that are connected to the
top event are calculated. Next, the code automatically removes
all modules and replicated events whose V-F importances are less
than the prescribed cut-off value. Each higher order module
which is removed contains some other modules and free components
that are attached to them. Therefore, there is no need to
compute the V-F importance of any of these attached members of
the removed higher order modules because their importances
are always equal to or less than that of the parent module which
by itself is lower than the cut-off value. If, however, the
higher order module is not removed because of its importance
being higher than the cut-off value, the code will proceed to
calculate importances of simple modules and components attached to
it, and to automatically remove components and simple modules
with importance low enough to be cancelled.
Therefore, starting from the top event of an unreduced
fault tree, all of the branches of the tree with low importances
will be cut. Those lower order branches and leaves which show
low importances compared to the cut-off value will be cancelled.
The pruned tree is the reduced version of the original tree.
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The pruning process is performed by setting the variable
STATE(2,I) which is the measure of the V-F importance for
components equal to zero. If the module is reduced, then auto-
matically all components I connected to this module are cancelled
(i.e., STATE(2,I) = 0).
For example, the removal of a simple AND module proceeds
as follows:
IF(PROP.LIM=le PROP.TIL(1)=0) THEN DO;
PROP. REL(2) =0
GO TO EME 1;
(To calculate the importance of the NOT gate if any)
END;
ELSE PROP.REL(2)=PER.REL(2)
IF(PROP.REL(2) <CUT-OFF) THEN PROP.REL(2)=0;
DO IT=l TO PROP.LIM;
STATE(2,PROP.TIL(IT))=PROP.REL(2);
END;
Therefore, all of the components input to the AND gate will
have an importance which is either equal to zero (i.e., cancelled)
or equal to the importance of the AND module.
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3. 4 Reductions of LPRS and HPIS Fault Trees
In order to demonstrate the reduction process, the reduced
fault tree of the Low Pressure-Recirculation System presented in
Appendix II of WASH-1400 is further reduced by using different
values for the cut-off limit. The maximum change in the top
event occurrence for the followIng range of cut-off values
10-2 cut-off 10~ has been observed not to exceed 1% from its
published version, i.e.,
(1 -+ 0.01) punreduced
For example, for the LPRS with 6 replicated and 61 non-replicated
components, the results for the various reduced versions which
follow from the application of the different cut-off values are
summarized in Table 3.4.1.
TABLE 3.4.1
Percentage Change in the Top Event Occurrence of
Reduced Trees of LPRS for Different Cut-off Values
Percentage
Cut-off No. of Free Com- No. of Replicated Com- Change in the
Value ponents Remained Components Remained Top Event
10-5 43 5 No change
10~4 37 5 No change
10~ 3 20 4 No change
10-2 12 2 1.1%
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It becomes obvious from Table 3.4.1 that for cut-off values
in the range of 10-5 to 10-3 no change in the top event occurs
and, therefore, one can safely use the upper bound (i.e., 10-3
for the cut-off value in order to get the most reduced tree,
thereby saving computation time. Even the use of 10-2 for the
cut-off provides a still reasonable fault tree for the LPRS
which results in a change of only 1.1% compared to the originally
published version. Investigation of the reduced fault trees
showed that they have essentially the same low order cut-sets
as the original fault tree, unless components of a low order
cut-set have very low probabilities so that they result in a
small V-F importance.
It is very important to understand that a component
with low probability or unavailability will not necessarily
result in a low V-F importance. For example, for the pressure
tank example Component 1 is found to have
IV.F. = 2.49937 x 10~ and
r
IV.F. = 7.49812 x 10111510
-8 -5However, P,=10 and P =10-, and, therefore, even though1 5-10
the replicated event has a probability of occurrence which is
by 3 orders of magnitude less than that of components 5 through 10,
its importance is _7 orders of magnitude larger. This means that
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any reduction process which is solely based on the orders of
event probabilities. does not necessarily result in a meaningful
reduced fault tree. To have the same order of magnitude for the
importance of the replicated event one needs to reduce the
probability of the replicated component down to P =10-15 which
r.
results in
IV.F. = 2.49937 x 10ll
r
From the abdve discussion it follows that the reduction
schemes in the code PL-MODT do not only provide an excellent
objective engineering judgment to reduce a fault tree, but it
is also instrumental in improving the design objectives of the
system under consideration.
The same kind of study is performed for the HPIS and for
a cut-off value of 10 3. The HPIS fault tree consists of 142
free and 13 replicated components. The reduction process resulted
in 53 free and 9 replicated components. The top event
remained unchanged and the low order cut-sets are almost the same.
Since there are no calculations or iterations involved in
the reduction procedure, the computer cost increase is negligibly
small compared to the modularization process. For example,
for the LPRS fault tree, the CPU time for modularization and
evaluation by the PL-MODT amounts to 0.46 seconds where it is
about 0.47 seconds if a reduction with cut-off value equal to 10-2
is requested in addition to the above calculations. Although the
saving does not become apparent for this steady-state example, it
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should be pointed out that a substantial saving will result if
one uses the reduced version for time-dependent fault tree
analysis and Monte-Carlo simulations.
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4. INCORPORATION OF A MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION
PACKAGE INTO THE CODE PL-MOD
4.1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that the Monte-Carlo simulation always
involves many calculations of the same kind. That is to say that
in order to calculate the top event of a fault tree, several
hundred to several thousand simulations have to be performed
on the accuracy desired. Each top event probability corresponds
to a specific set of possible components' failure data. The
code PL-MOD provides the modular cut-sets which in turn are very
simple and efficient to use for the top event calculations.
The codes SAMPLE [31 and LIMITS [2] are two examples of
codes which have recently been used for Monte-Carlo simulations.
The SAMPLE code has been used in WASH-1400 to calculate reliability
bounds. Both codes require a system function as input to identify
the logical dependencies in the systems thatare being analyzed.
For very large fault trees, construction of this equation is a
difficult process and most of the time serious errors may result
from mistakes during the construction of this function. Therefore,
for large fault trees it would seem more comfortable to use the
fault tree itself as an input rather than the system equation
derived from the cut-sets of the fault tree.
The code PL-MOD is used to calculate the modular cut-sets
and the NUMERO subroutine in this code is modified such that it
can handle fault trees consisting of steady-state components with
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some uncertainties associated with their failure rates. The new
code is called PL-MODMC, where MC stands for the Monte-Carlo
package added to the PL-MOD code.
The failure rates of the components are assumed to be
log-normally distributed. The same sorting routine which has
been used in the code LIMITS is adopted here since it has been
demonstrated that it is very fast and efficient. However, an
efficient PL/i random number generation is developed and used in
PL-MODMC. This random number generator was found to be very
simple and fast. The output of the PL-MODMC consists of the top
event probability for any arbitrary set of confidence limits.
Also, mean and point unavailabilities along with the top event
standard deviation are also calculated. The minimum probability
and maximum error for each confidence level will also be provided
by PL-MODMC.
4.2 Mathematical Concepts of the Monte-Carlo Method in Fault
Tree Analysis
As was discussed in the previous chapters, fixed values for
failure rates and other data are commonly referred to as point
values. In a probabilistic approach, because of the variations
and uncertainties in the failure rates and other parameters, these
quantities should be treated as random variables.
In the code PL-MODMC, the lognormal distribution serves as
the basis of the uncertainty propagation. However, the use of
other distributions in the code should be easily established.
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The log-normal distribution is found to be more adequate and
convenient to be used in fault tree analysis because the raw
input data are sparse and the assessed ranges are large, having
widths of one or two orders of magnitude. Also, examinations of
the existing data showed that the log-normal distribution gives
an adequate empirical fit.
The random variable t has a log-normal distribution if its
logarithm follows a normal distribution. The distribution is
skewed to the right. For example, having a possible range
between t/f and t.f (f is a factor) for a log-normal distribution,
this range transfers to logt + logf which is a description of
normally distributed data. Therefore, the log-normal distribution
describes data which vary by factors. On the other hand, the
normal distribution describes data which vary by additive or
subtractive increments.
Most of the failure data can vary by factors. For-example,
a failure rate estimated at 10-6 could vary from 10~ to 10-5 which
is (10- 6/10) to (10- 6x10). The log-normal distribution has two
parameters: y specifying the distribution scale and a specifying
its shape. The probability density function (P.d.f) for a
log-normal distribution is given by:
1 (Lrat - y)2f(t) = exp-[ 2  ; t>0 (4.2.1)
(2. t l 2 a
From Eq. (4.2.1) the following parameters can be calculated:
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2
Mode (the most probable value): t =ep~a
m
Median: t0.5 = e' or in terms of the upper and lower bounds
t0.5 = Xu'XL
Mean: t = ey /2
Variance: v = e2p+a2 [(e2 -1)
The Monte-Carlo technique by itself is very simple. Once
the log-normal distribution parameters are known for all of the
components of a fault tree, these values are then used to compute
a point value for the top event probability using the cut-sets
which have been provided by the analysis of the fault tree.
The procedure is repeated for a large number of trials and the
results are sorted to obtain an estimate of the system unavaila-
bility distribution.
One of the important factors in a Monte-Carlo simulation
is its accuracy. The accuracy of an estimated distribution by
sampling is discussed in [4].
It is known that
pr(IX(P) - P I < P) = erf( t ) + R (4.2.2)
where
X (P) = M/N
N is the number of trials; M is the number of successes.
t = E
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P = the p parameter of a binomial distribution
q= 1 - p
R = error associated with the probability measure which
is given by
-t 2/2 0.2+0.25 P- - pq
iR| < e + 0 pq + e (4.2.3)
2Np q Npq 2
erf(t) = error function of a variable t= f7 0 e .du
For example, pr([-X (0.95) - 0.951) < 0.01) means the
probability that X0.95 lies between the probability limits of
0.94 and 0.96. In other words, the value of X is associated with
a confidence interval of P+e, with a probability of erf (-- + R),
and as can be seen it is not dependent on the distribution but on
the confidence level.
In the code PL-MODMC, the value of e is calculated by
subtracting the smallest confidence level from zero. For example,
if the smallest confidence level is 0.5% (i.e., the largest
confidence level is 99.5%), then the accuracy is E=0.5. Therefore,
the minimum probability would be
erf(-) - max(R)
For a large sample size N, it follows that
pr(Its - tPI < 1.36 ) = 0.95
p N
where t is the estimated distribution fractile, and tp is the
corresponding exact cumulative distribution value of the underlying
population from which the sample was picked randomly. For example,
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for a sample size of 2000 we will be 95% sure that the estimated
distribution deviates by not more than 0.03 from the exact
distribution.
4.3 The PL/1 Random Numbers Generator Used in the Code PL-MODMC
The task is to generate random numbers for the calculation
of samples from the components' failure rate distributions. A
PL/1 random number generator has been developed for this purpose
and implemented into the PL-MODMC. The numbers generated by
this generator are normally deviating about a specified value
which the user must provide as an input. The Central Limit
Theorem is applied to generate normal random numbers. Then, each
of these random numbers is used to calculate the failure rates
from specified log-normal distributions. The PL/1 listing of
this random number generator procedure is given below.
RAND: PROCEDURE OPTIONS (MAIN);
DECLARE (IY,A,IYl,X) FLOAT DECIMAL(16);
DECLARE CEIL BUILTIN;
GET LIST (N,X,M);
IY=X/0.499977;
IYl=IY;
DO WHILE (M>0);
A=0;
DO I=1 TO N;
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IYl=CEIL (IYl);
IY=IY-IYl+l;
A=A+IY;
IYl=IY*65539;
IY=IYl;
END;
PUT DATA (A)(SKIP (2), F(12,5));
M=M-l;
END;
END RAND;
This random number generator is very fast, primarily
because it is written in PL/l language. The variable N denotes
the approximation of the Central Limit Theorem. The variable X
is any odd-starting number to generate random numbers. Finally,
the variable M is the total number of random numbers to be generated.
The computation time for generating 4000 random numbers by using
the above procedure is 0.026 se c. of CPU time.
4.4 Description of the Code PL-MODMC
As was discussed before, the code PL-MODMC is developed
to incorporate the capability of a Monte-Carlo simulation using
the modular cut-sets that the code PL-MOD generates. In the
modified form of the code, the subroutines IMPORTANCE and STATE-IN
are not used. Therefore, the code PL-MODMC does not perform any
importance calculations and automatic fault reductions. However,
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it is acknowledged that it would be much simpler if the code
would automatically reduce the tree and then perform a Monte-Carlo
simulation. This option is not incorporated into the code yet,
but it is hoped that it will be incorporated during the future
research activities. This would not only reduce the computation
time, but would also provide almost the same top event probability
for different confidence levels of the original unreduced tree.
The Monte-Carlo code PL-MODMC has been developed in two
steps:
Step 1 includes the development of the MONTCA subroutine.
Step 2 includes some minor changes in the NUMERO and EXPECT
subroutines.
4.4.1 Step 1
The subroutine MONTCA consists of a special procedure to
choose failure rate samples from each component log-normal
distribution. First, any arbitrary combination of confidence
levels is given by the user, and an array will be allocated to
store them. Also, the total number of trials is provided by the
user. Then, the computer calculates the maximum error and the
minimum probabilities for each confidence level by using Eqs.
(4.2.2) and (4.2.3).
Second, a special procedure enables the code to use point
values of the failure rates to calculate the top event probability
(Class 1 components in the PL-MODT code).
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Third, the Monte-Carlo simulation starts by using the median
and spread values given by the user whichare stored in the
allocated array MEDIAN(I) and FEN2(I), respectively.
Finally, the following procedure similar to that of the
SAMPLE code is employed:
DO I=1 TO VEN;
[VEN is the total number of replicated and non-replicated
events, i.e., VEN=FUN+DUN;]
IF (MEDIAN(I)=0) THEN FEN1(I)=0;
ELSE FENl(I)=LOG(MEDIAN(I));
IF (FEN2(I)-i=0) THEN
FEN2(I)=LOG(FEN2(I))/1.64;
END;
XPl=SQRT(12/N);
(N is the same variable described in Sec. 4.3)
ALLOCATE TOP-P;
(to store different top event probabilities that are
calculated in the EXPECT subroutine)
RANDOM GENERATOR
procedure follows here
XPl=XPl*(AA-0.5*N)*FEN2(I)+FEN1(I);
(AA calculated by the random number generator, it is
identical to the variable A described in Section 4.3)
IF (XPl=0) THEN MEDIAN (I)=0;
ELSE MEDIAN(I)=EXP(XPl);
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At this point, the values calculated at each trial will be
assigned to the STATE and STATD arrays which are ALLOCATED
before as follows:
DO K=1 TO FUN;
STATE (1,K)=MEDIAN(K);
END;
DO N=1 to DUN;
J=N+FUN;
STATE (1,N)=MEDIAN(J);
END;
At this stage,.the modified subroutine EXPECT is called to
calculate the top event probability from the modular cut-sets
by using the data obtained in the trials for the component
unavailabilities that are stored in the MEDIAN array. Therefore,
it follows:
CALL EXPECT;
TOP-P (ASACH)=REY;
ASACH=ASACH+l;
where REY is the top event probability that is assigned to
this variable in the EXPECT subroutine. When ASACH exceeds the
total number of trials requested by the user, the code calculates
the mean value and the standard deviation of the top event
probability from the TOP-P(ASACH).
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At the end, the same sorting routine as utilized in the
LIMITS code is used in the PL-MODMC with some changes to allow
its formulation in PL/1 language. This sorting method has an
empirical computer time requirement directly proportional to
nl.22 6 . The method does not take up any additional computer
core memory. When the sorting process is finished, the spread
factors for the top event are calculated by simply using the
following equations.
P
F -=5 (14.4.1)
1 0 5
P
F2 - 95 (4.4.2)
P50
where P0 5, 50, and P95 are the top event probabilities which are
calculated in the sorting process for 5%, 50% (which is also the
median value for the top event) and 95% confidence levels. The
Monte-Carlo calculation ends by printing the top event probabilities
for different confidence levels along with the mean values,
standard deviations, median values, 5% and 95% error factors
(spread values), and the point unavailability.
4.4.2 Step 2
The subroutine EXPECT is used in PL-MODMC to calculate the
top event probability for each trial. The same form of the
EXPECT subroutine that is used in the PL-MODT has been modified
to be used in this code.
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The new form of EXPECT is designed such that there is no
printout of probabilities for modules and the top event at the
end of each trial. Rather, only top events will be stored in
the TOP-P (ASACH) array. Also, some features are added to the
subroutine to utilize all spaces used to store different variables
that are not necessary for a.Monte-Carlo calculation, such as
probabilities or different higher-order modules that are auto-
matically calculated in each trial by the EXPECT subroutine.
4.5 Examples
Two examples are provided in this section: first, the same
reduced fault tree given in the LIMITS code [2] for a Reactor
Protection System; second, the LPRS fault tree given in WASH-1400
is used to calculate the probability of the top event for different
confidence levels.
For the reduced fault tree of the Reactor Protection System
(Figure 4.5.1), the CPU times for the three codes LIMITS, SAMPLE,
and PL-MODMC are found and presented in Figure 4.5.2. The
probabilities calculated by the PL-MODMC agree well with the
other two codes. The results for the fault tree in Figure 4.5.1
and failure data in Table 4.5.1 are given in Table 4.5.2. Slight
differences from those given in [21 and in Table 4.5.2 are because
of the different techniques that are employed. For instance,
random numbers are generated by slightly different techniques.
It should be noticed that CPU time is comparatively higher
for PL-MODMC than for the LIMITS code. This is because of the
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IED0001F:
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Failure of suff.. no. of rods to drop when power
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Breaker BYA closed due to test and maintenance
Breaker BYB closed due to test and maintenance
Train 'A' logic fault
Train 'B' logic fault
is removed.
Figure 4.5.1: Reduced Fault Tree of the Reactor Protection
System for a PWR [2].
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Table 4.5.1: Failure Data for the Reactor Protection
System of a Pressurized Water Reactor [2]
Failure Fault Exposure Unavai.1- Error
Event -
Rate (Hr.) Time (Hr.) ability q, Factor
IEDO00F 1.7X10-5  10
ICB0004C 1.0X10-6  360 3.6X10~4  3
ICB0005D 1.0X10- 3  3
ICB0005C 1.0X10-6  360 1.X10-3  3
ICB0004D 3.6X10~4  3
ICB0003X 6.1X10-3 4
ICB0002X. -6.1X10 3  4
ITMOO25Q
Odd # 9.7X10~4  10
Even # 9.7X10~4 10
II
. .. ..........
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4.5.2: Execution Times of the LIMITS, SAMPLE & PL-MODMC
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fact that the calculation time of PL-MODMC includes the modulari-
zation and the minimal modular cut-set generation. Therefore,
the curves in Figure 4.5.2 do not represent a real comparison
between PL-MODMC and the other two codes. Although the modulari-
zation needs only a small fraction of the time consumed in the
PL-MODMC, the CPU time is primarily due to the establishment of
several structures and calling some subroutines at each individual
trial. A more honest comparison between the codes would be
obtained by adding the CPU time consumed by the fault tree analysis
code such as MOCUS to calculate the cut-sets prior to the use
of LIMITS or SAMPLE codes to the CPU times consumed by the LIMITS
and SAMPLE codes.
From the discussion above, it becomes apparent that the use
of the code PL-MODMC for a Monte-Carlo analysis of very large
fault trees may be very economical. It has also been found that
the CPU time in PL-MODMC is more sensitive to the number of
trials rather than the size of the tree.
The LPRS fault tree with 61 free components and 6 replicated
components were input into the PL-MODMC and 1200 trials were
simulated. The results are presented in Table 4.5.3. The
computation time including the modularization is 52 seconds.
In general, the results agree well with those given in WASH-1400
as can be seen by the comparison presented in Table 4.5.4.
Table 4.5.3:
MEAN PROUI= 1. 410070E-02
ERROR FACTOR (5%)= 2.13365
CONFIDENCE LEVEL
0.50000
1. 00000
2.50000
5.00000
10.00000
15.00000
20. 00000
30.00000
40.00000
50. 00000
60.00000
70. 00000
8 0.00000
85. COOO
90. 00000
95. 00000
97. 50000
99. 00000
9.50000
LPRS Top Event Unavailability for 1200 Trials Using PL-MODMC
STANDARD DEVIATION= 7.909754E-03
E RROEt FACTOR (95%)= 2.21611 MEDI AN PROS=1. 2430
PROBABILITY MAX ERROR MIN PROBABILI
3.575392L-03 1.893921E-01 7.656468
4.353750E-03 1.224911E-01 7.222902
5. 138319E-03 8. 370483 E-02 5.512648
5.825788E-03 6 .37 1158E-0 2 4.198762
6. 662294E-03 4.763011E-02 3.150179
7,352761E-03 4.019815E-02 2.677403
8 ..05 2737 E-03 3.585986F-02 2.434665
9.505350E-13 3.113346E-02 2.112458
1.096696E-02 2.8918286E-02 1.98 2517
.1.24 3022E-02 2.810337 E-02 1.945992
1.385169E-02 2.8918 28E-02 1.982517
1.591348E-02 3.113346E-02 2.112458
1.868913E-02 3.585986 E-02 2.434665
2. 036301E-02 4.0198 15E-02 2.6771403
2. 358368E-02 4.763011E-02 3.150179
2.754679E-02 6.37 1158E-02 4.198762
3.38 150 4E-02 8.370483 E-02 5.51 26148
3.927734E-02 1.224911E-0 1 7. 2229 02
4.923805E-02 1 .893921E-01 7.656468
022E'-02
TY
E- 01
E- 0 1
E-01
E-01
E- 01
E- 01
E-0 1
E-01
E-01
E-0 1
E-01
E-01
E*-0 1
E- 01
E- 01
E- 01
2E- 0 1
E-01
E- 01
H
H
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TABLE 4.5. 4
Comparison of the LPRS Fault Tree Simulation Using PL-MODMC
And the Results Calculated by the SAMPLE Code in WASH-1400
Confidence Level WASH-1400 (SAMPLE) PL-MODMC
1.3 x 10- 2
4. 4 x 10-3
3.1 x 10-2
1.24 x 10-2
5.82 x 10-3
2.75 x 10-2
50%
5%
95%
116
REFERENCES
[1] J. Olmos and L. Wolf, "A Modular Approach to Fault Tree and
Reliability Analysis", MITNE-209, Dept. Nucl. Engng.,
MIT (August 1977).
[2] Y.L. Lee and S.L. Salem, "Probability Intervals for Reliability
of Complex Systems Using Monte-Carlo Simulation", UCLA-ENG-7758
(December 1977).
[3]. "Reactor Safety Study", WASH-1400, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (October 1975).
[4] D.K. Lloyd and M. Lipow, "Reliability: Management, Methods,
and Mathematics", 2nd Ed. (1977).
[5] M. Modarres and L. Wolf, "PL-MODT: A Modular Approach
to Fault Tree and Reliability Analysis", ANS Meeting,
San Diego, June 1978.
117
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
During this research period, the code PL-MOD has been
extended to include some additional features such as time-
dependent basic events, automatic fault tree reduction, and
Monte-Carlo simulation.
The original algorithm to derive a fault tree's modular
composition directly from its diagram was already reported by
Olmos and Wolf [1]. The procedure consists of piecewise collapsing
and modularizing portions of the tree, until eventually the
fault tree structure is described as a set of modular equations
recursively relating the top tree event to its basic component
inputs. The structural representation of fault trees containing
replicated events was shown to necessitate the use of higher-
order gate modules. A Boolean vector representation was chosen
to express the family of minimal cut-sets corresponding to a
higher-order gate. The code PL-MOD is written in PL/l in order
to take advantage of the list processing capabilities available
in this computer language. For instance, extensive use is made
of based structure pointer variables and dynamic storage allocation.
Moreover, the manipulation of Boolean state vectors, which
requires the treatment of higher-order modular structures, is
conveniently performed by using bit-string variables.
In a second step, the code PL-MODT has been developed to
handle time-dependent events and automatic fault tree reduction
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based on the importance measures of different modules and com-
ponents in the tree. Four classes of components are used to
include the time-dependent behavior of basic free and replicated
components. These classes of components are as follows:
a) Class 1 components, which are components with a finite
time-independent probability of occurrence.
b) Class 2 components, which are non-repairable components
where the failure rates are time-independent.
c) Class 3 components, which are repairable components
where the failure and repair rates are time-dependent.
d) Class 4 components, which are repairable components,
whose failures are detected upon periodic inspection.
The code PL-MODT employs the same modularization algorithm
utilized in the code PL-MOD, but includes the aforementioned
four classes of components. Various approximations are employed
in this code to make the time-dependent calculations fast and
economical. Some useful features such as the calculation of the
mean unavailability and the option of different time step mesh
sizes during different periods in life have been incorporated
into PL-MODT. The upper bound cut-set probability approximation
is changed to the prediction of exact values, which enables the
PL-MODT code now to handle large unavailabiltiy values (i.e.,
unavailabilities close to 1).
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It is found that the PL-MODT calculations are performed
efficiently, economically, and accurately. Benchmarking tests
against the codes KITT and FRANTIC have clearly demonstrated
these advantages. It should be noticed that the use of the
KITT and FRANTIC codes is not as straightforward as the application
of PL-MODT because prior to the use of KITT, the code PREP
must be employed in order to find low-order cut-sets of the
fault tree. Similarly, in FRANTIC, a system equation (QS) has
to be supplied by the user which indicates the logical dependencies
of input components. This equation usually becomes quite compli-
cated for large fault trees. In contrast to these procedures,
in PL-MODT only the fault tree structure and components' failure
characteristics are inputted. Thus, appreciable savings in
computation time and manpower result when large fault trees are
to be analyzed by PL-MODT.
A reduction scheme of a tree is incorporated into the PL-MODT
code to provide an objective judgment for the reduction of a
large fault tree, such that the probability of occurrence of the
top event is essentially maintained. For this purpose, the
cut-off value is defined. It provides a criterion for eliminating
those modules and components whose importances are lower than this
prespecified value. In the reduction analysis of fault trees such
as for the LPRS and the HPIS, it is found that cut-off values in
the range of 10-2 to 10-3 provide the simplest and yet still
accurate reduced versions of the trees. It is demonstrated that
the use of the reduced version of a large fault tree enhances the
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understanding and processing of the tree for further analysis
(i.e., Monte-Carlo analysis, time-dependent analysis, etc.).
Due to uncertainties associated with the failure data of
fault tree components, it is important to implement a Monte-Carlo
analysis to propagate input uncertainties up to the top -event.
For this purpose, the code PL-MODMC was developed. It enables
the user to work with large fault trees. The code has been bench-
marked against the well-known SAMPLE code and the recently
developed LIMITS code. The comparison showed good agreement for
the sample cases considered. The codes SAMPLE and LIMITS require
the generation of fault tree cut-sets prior to their Monte-Carlo
simulations (i.e., using either the codes PREP or MOCUS), whereas
PL-MODMC uses the modular minimal cut-sets that are already
generated before calling the MONTCA subroutine which is described
in Chapter 4.
Although the codes PL-MOD, PL-MODT, and PL-MODMC have been
proven to be valuable tools for various aspects of fault tree
analysis and evaluation, they all have the same restriction in
common to only handle replicated modular gates, i.e., replicated
gates representing a supercomponent event independent from all
other gates in the tree. However, in general, replicated gates
may exist which do not represent only a supercomponent event. A
study has been recently initiated to eliminate this restriction.
Its removal will significantly enhance the capabilities of the
code. It is recommended that after the removal of the afore-
mentioned restriction the following features be incorporated
into the code.
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i) Generation of all simple minimal cut-sets from the
fault tree's modular cut-sets of up to an order specified by the
user. Appendix B summarizes the efforts undertaken in this
direction thus far. The comparison with the specially designed
fault tree analysis code, FTAP (UCB), is indeed very encouraging.
ii) Application of these simple cut-sets to generate the
system equation (QS) and incorporation of this equation into the
PL-MODT and PL-MODMC codes to save computation time, especially
for PL-MODMC.
iii) Common cause analysis should be effectively performed by
the modular decomposition approach. For instance, by generating
different modular tree representations associated with postulated
common cause failure modes being considered, one would be able to
access the contribution of the common cause failure to the top
event.
iv) Derivation and implementation of a unique and meaningful
importance measure for periodically tested components. This
would avoid the abrupt change in the unavailability in the transi-
tion between the different periods experienced by using the V-F
importance measure.
v) Extension and application of the Monte-Carlo simulation
to time-dependent problems, where repair rates and test intervals
are considered to be random variables in addition to the failure
rates. Here, the modular decomposition approach offers unique
savings in computation time because it operates on numbers of
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modular cut-sets which are by orders of magnitude smaller than the
number of minimal cut-sets commonly applied. Thus, realistic
uncertainty propagation for time-dependent problems seems to be
in reach in the near future.
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APPENDIX A
USERS MANUAL FOR THE CODES PL-MODT AND PL-MODMC
A.1 Introduction
This manual describes the input for the code PL-MOD El] for
the modular fault tree analysis and steady state reliability
analysis as well as for the extended version PL-MODT [21 which
.accounts for time-dependent processes and automatic fault tree
reduction now without using the concept of minimal cut-sets.
Both versions use the language PL/1 and the most recent IBM
PL/l compiler with optimization on the 370/168. For these
reasons, the effectiveness and operation of these codes seem to
be highly system-dependent.
It should be pointed out that PL-MODT is merely an extension
of the PL-MOD code, and thus relies upon the same modularization
procedure. The user has the option to either select a steady
state or time-dependent calculation once the modules have been
determined by the code. Therefore, this manual is equally
applicable for the original version and for the most recent one.
In Section A.2 input to the code PL-MODT is presented, and in
Section A.3 input to the code PL-MODMC is described.
In what follows, each card group is identified by a special
name in order to more easily comprehend the meaning of this group.
Furthermore, the variable names and their meanings are given.
Special notes will provide extra information where needed to support
the user in setting up his own problem.
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The input to the code is FORMAT free. The only requirement
is that the data, when punched on th.e same card, be separated
by at least one blank space or a comma.
To make the manual more clear at the end (Section A.4),
some sample problems are presented, showing different inputs for
PL-MODT and PL-MODMC codes.
A.2 Description of the Code PL-MODT
1. Jard groups I through VIII describe fault tree logic following
these card groups. Any one of the following card. group sets
described in Parts 3 through 5 plus the card group in Part 2
could be used.
2. Card groups IX and X are control cards for the type of time-
dependent analysis to be used.
3. Card groups X through XIII are for the analysis of Class 1
components (time-independent PL-MOD case).
4. Card groups XIV through XVIII are for the analysis of Class 2
components.
5. Card groups XIX through XXIII are for the analysis of Class 3
components.
6. Card groups XXIV through XXVIII are for the analysis of Class 4
components, or a combination of the three time-dependent
components.
7. Card group XXIX is the reduction option card.
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INPUT DESCRIPTION
Title Card
CARD GROUP I: TITLE CARD
No. of Variable
1
.Variable
TITLE
Entry
A set of characters en-
closed by a single quote
marks
NOTE: Number of characters must be equal to or less than
71.
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Calculated Options
CARD GROUP II: RELIABILITY PARAMETER OPTION
No. of Variable Variable Entry
DEL Number of items to be
computed if DEL = 1
only reliabilities or
unavailabilities are
calculated.
IF DEL = 2
reliabilities and import-
ances are calculated.
NOTE: When periodically tested or repairable (revealed
fault) components are considered, it is recommended
to set DEL=l because the importance measure built
into the code seemingly loses its meaning under
these conditions.
When automatic reduction of the tree is desired,
the value of DEL must be equal to 2 (i.e., DEL=2).
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Fault Tree Characteristics
CARD GROUP III: GATES,
No. of Variable Variable
GUM
Entry
Total number of fault
tree gates
NOTE: GUM includes all AND, OR, and k-out-of-N gates
but excludes replicated gates (modules). The
replicated gates in the original tree will be
considered as a replicated component or module.
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CARD .GROUP IV::
No. of Variable
1
REPLICATED MODULES
Variable
RMOD
'Entry
Total number of replicated
modules
= 0 for no replications
NOTE: RMOD does not include replicated components.
However, replicated components may be repre-
sented in a replicated module, i.e., component
is replicated within this module.
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CARD GROUP V: TREE STRUCTURE
No. of' Variable
2
3
4
Vartable
AGIN(I)
ALIL(I)
ALIR(I)
Entry
Gate number
Total number of' gate inputs
to gate number I
Total number of leafs
which :are input to gate
number I
Total number of replicated
leafs which are input to
gate number I
= 0 no replicated leaf
NOTE: I=1, 2, ... ,GUM
I includes all gates and associated modules,
i.e., replicated or non-replicated modules in
the tree.
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CARD GROUP VI: REPLICATED 14ODULES
No. of Variable Variable - ntry
TRIM(I) Name of replicated leaf
associated with a module
2 TRIN(I) Number of replicated gate
NOTE: I m 1, 2, ... , RMOD
If RMOD = 0 on card group IV, then card group
VI is to be skipped. If replicated gates exist
then TRIM(I) m A9BCD,
where
A : Total number of occurrences of the
specific replicated module
Nine -9: Replication of gate or module
BCD : Number of replicated components asso-
ciated with this module in the fault
tree.
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CARD GROUP, VII: REPLICATED LEAVES
No. of Variable
1
Variable
NOR
Entry
Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
= 0 no replicated leaf
inputs
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CARD GROUP VIII: GATE STRUCTURE
No. of Variable . Variable
NAME
VALUE
GIN
PIT(I)
I = 1,2,.. I
LIL
Gate Number
= 1 for AND.gate
= 2 for OR gate
= KON for K-out-of N
gate
Total number of gate
inputs to this gate
I-th gate input
For GIN = 0, then
PIT(I) = 0
Total number of free
leaf inputs
TIL(I)
I = 1,2,...,LIL
LIR
TIR(I)
I-th free leaf input
For LIL = 0, then
TIL(I) = 0
Total number of repli-
cated leaf inputs
I-th replicated leaf
input
I = 1,2,...,LIR For LIR = 0,then
TIR(I) = 0
Entry
2 .
3.
5
6
7
8
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NOTE: LIT(I) = AOBCD
where A: total number of occurrences of this
component
BCD: number of replicated component
For dual replicated components:
LIR (I) = AlBCD when ON
= A2BCD when OFF
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Numer ical Evaluations
CARD GROUP IX: EVALUATION OPTION
No. of Variable * Variable
FOX = 0 numerical evaluation
is not desired
1 numerical evaluation
is desired
NOTE: If FOX = 0, then all of the following card
groups can be deleted.
If the former version, PL-MOD is to be run,
only card groups XI, XII and XIII should be
used After this card group.
If PL-MODT is to be run, card group X must
be included and the procedure thereafter.
Entry
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CARD GROUP X: CALCULATION OPTION
No. of Variable Variable Entry
ESF 1 for steady state
calculation
= 2 for time-dependent
calculation of non-re-
pairable components
3 for time-dependent
calculation of repair-
able components
4 for time-dependent
calculation of perio-
dically tested compo-
nents, or the combina-
tion of periodically
tested components and
time-dependent non-re-
pairable or repairable
nontested components.
NOTE: For ESF=l, only card groups XI, XII, XIII and XXIX are
needed in what follows.
For ESF=2, only card groups XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII
and XXIX are needed.
For- ESF=3, only card groups XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII,
and XXIX are needed.
(cont.)
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CARD GROUP X: CALCULATION OPTION (cont.)
For ESF = 4, only card groups XXIV, XXV, XXVI,
XXVII, XXVIII and XXIX are needed.
If none of these options is desired, any
number other than 1, 2, 3, 4 suffices, and
all of the following card groups should be
deleted.
a
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CARD GROUP XI:
No. of Variabl
1
2
LEAF INPUT
Variable
FUN
DUN
Entry
Total number of free
leaf inputs
Total number -of repli-
cated leaf inputs
= 0,. no replicated com-
ponents or modules.
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CARD GROUP XII: COMPONENT RELIABILITY
No. of Variable
1
: Variable ~ Entry
Number of free component
I =1, 2, ... FUN
STATE(1,I)~ Probability of occurrence
of the I-th free input
2
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CARD GROUP XIII: REPLICA!TBD COMPONENT RELIABILITY
No. of Variable Va'riable
I
STATD(1, I)
Number of replicated compo-
nent
Probability associated with
the I-th replicated component
= 0 if I-th component is
associated with a repli-
cated module
1
2
Entry
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CARD * GROUP XIV: TIME STEP CHANGES
No*. of Variable
1
Variable
MOH
Ent ry
Number of regions where
time step size changes
= 1 for no changes in time
step size
NOTE: This card group must be supplied. for ESF = 2
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XV: TIME 4TEF- INPUT
No. of Variable
1
Variable
DEL9 T (1,1I)
Entry
Time step associated with
the I-th region
AUN (1, 1)
I = 1,2,...,MOH
Time interval for which
time step size is applied
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2
(see card group X).
2
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CARD GROUP XVI: LEAE-,'INPUT
6No. of Variable
1
2
Variab le
FUN
DUN
Entry
Total number of free leaf
inputs
Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
= 0 no replicated compo-
nents or modules
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2
(see card group X).
144
CARD GROUP XVII: FREE COMPONENT FAILURE RATE
No. of Variable
1
2
: Variable
STATT (1,1)
Entry
Number of free component
Failure rate X(hr~) asso-
ciated with the I-th free
component
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XVIII: REPICATED COMPONENT FAILURE RATE
No. of Variable
2
* Variable
STATS(1,I)
Entry
Number of replicated com-
ponent
Failure rate X(hr~) asso-
ciated with the I-th repli-
cated component
= 0 if I is a replicated
component associated;
with a. replicated
module.
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XIX: TIME STEP CHANGES
No. of Variable
- 1
Variable
MOH
Entry
Number of regions where
time step size changes.
= 1 for no changes in
time step size.
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XX: TIME STEP INPUT
No. of Variable
1
Variable
DEL9T(1,I)
Entry
Time step associated with
the Ith region
AUN (1, I) Time step interval for
1=1, 2,...,MOH which time step size is
applied
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF=3 (see
card group X).
2
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CARD GROUP XXI: LEAF INPUT
No. of -Variable
'o 1
Variable
FUN
Entry
Total number of free
leaf inputs
2 DUN Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
= 0 no replicated
components or modules
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP. XXII: FREE COMPONENT FAILURE AND REPAIR RATES
No. of -Variable
1
2
3
Variable
I
STATT(1,I)
STATTE(1,I)
Entry
Number of free components
Failure rate X(hr~)
associated with the
Ith free component
Repair rate y (hr~)
associated with the Ith
free component
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XXIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT FAILURE AND REPAIR
RATES
No. of Variable
1
2
3
Variable
I
STATS(1, I)
STATED(1,I)
Entry
Number of replicated
component
Failure rate A(hr )
associated with the
Ith replicated component
=0 if I is a replicated
component associated
with a module.
Repair rate y(hr~ )
associated with the Ith
replicated component
NOTE: If STATS(l,I)=0 (i. e., the component I is associated
with a replicated module), then STATED(1,I)=1.
This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3 (see
card group X).
151
CARD GROUP XXIV: TIME STEP CHANGES
No. of Variable
1
Variable
MOH
Entry
Number of regions where
time step size changes
1 for no changes in
time step size
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 4
(see card group X).
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CARD GROUP TIME 'STEP INPUT
No. of Variable
1
- Variable
DEL9T(1, I)
Entry
Time step associated with
the I-th region
AUN (1,I)
S1,2,.. 0.MOH
Time interval for which
time step size is applied
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF =
(see card group X).
2
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CAOD GROUP XXVI LEAF TNPUT
No. of Variable Variable
FUN Total number of free leaf
input s
DUN Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
= 0 no replicated compo-
nents or modules
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF - 4
(see card group X).
1
2
~ Entry
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CARD GROUP XXVII: FREE :COMPONENT TEST DATA
No. of Variables
2
3
4
5
6
7
Variables
. I
STATT (1,I)
ETTA(1,I)
TTETA(1,I)
TAVV(1,I)
FIRTM(1,I)
QUZR(1,I)
Entry
Number of free. component
Failure rate A(hr~) asso-
ciated with I-th free compo-
nent
Time between inspections
(hrs).
Inspection time (hrs).
Repair-!time (hrs).
Time of first inspection
(hrs).
Override probability
NOTE: If the component is not inspected, then ETTA(1,I) = 0,
TTETA(1,I) = 0, TAVV(1,I) = 0, FIRT(1,I) = 0, and
QUZR(lI) = 0. In this case the component will be con-
sidered as being a nonrepairable one. If the component
is repairab-le but not tested (revealed fault), then ETTA(1,I)
=0, TTETA(1,I)=repair rate (hr~ ), TAVV(l,I)=0,
FIRT(1,I)=O and QUZR (1,I)=0.
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CARD GROUP XXVIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT TEST DATA
Variable Variable
I
No. of
2
3
Entr
Number- of replicated compo-
nent
Failure ra-te X(hr~) asso-
ciated with this component
Time between inspections
(hrs)
Inspection time (hrs).
Repair time (hrs).
Time of first inspection
(hrs).
Override probability
. NOTE: If the component is not inspected then ETTAD(1,I)
= 0, TTETAD(1,I) = 0, TAVVD(1,I) = 0, FIRTMD(1,I)
= 0, and QUZRD(1,I) = 0.
If the component is associated with.a repli-
cated module then STATS (1,I) = 0, ETTAD(1,I) = 0,
TTETAD(1,I) = 0,TAVVD(1,I) = 0, FIRTMD(1,I) = 0,
and QUZRD(l,I) 0. In this case the component
is considered as being a nonrepairable one.
If the component is repairable but not tested
(revealed fault), then ETTAD(1,I)=0, TTETAD(1,I)
=repair rate (hr~ ), TTETAD(1,I)=0, TAVVD(1,I)
=0,FIRTMD(1,I)=0, and QUZRD(1,I)=o.
STATS(l,I)
ETTAD(1,I)
TTETAD
TAVV (1,I)
FIRTMD(l,I)
QUZR(1,I)
4
5
6
7
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CARD GROUP XXIX: REDUCTION OPTION CARD
No. of Variable
1
Variable
CUT-OFF
Entry
The cut-off value.
Any component having
an importance less than
this value will be can-
celled from the fault
tree.
NOTE: If DEL=l, then this card group is not needed since no
importance calculation is performed.
If DEL=2 and CUT-OFF=O, then no reduction process will be
performed. Only the importances of modules and components
in the fault tree will be calculated.
If DEL=2 and CUT-OFF>O, then the reduction procedure will
be followed.
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A.3 Description of the Code PL-MODMC
1. Card groups I through VIII are the same for the codes PL-MODT
and PL-MODMC. These card groups are described in Section A.2
of this manual.
2. Card groups VIII through XIII are input data for a Monte-Carlo
simulation.
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CARD GROUP IX:
No. of Variable
CONFIDENCE LEVEL DATA
Variable
ROM
I
CONPNT(I)
I=l,2,...,ROM
Total number of different
confidence levels that the
top event probability should-
be evaluated for.
Number of confidence level.
Confidence level (e.g.,
CONPNT(I)=40 means the
I-th confidence level is 40%.
NOTE: In this code, the accuracy is equal to the lowest confidence
level (CONPNT(l)), i.e., if CONPNT (1)=0.5, then accuracy=0.5.
1
I
Entry
2
3
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CARD GROUP X: RANDOM GENERATOR INITIATING NUMBER
No. of Variable Variable
.Any odd number to start
generating random numbers.
IPP
Entry
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CARD GROUP XI:
No. of Variable
1
2
SIMULATION CONTROL CARD
Variable
FUN
DUN
3
14
NRAND
NTERM
Entry
Total number of free leaf
inputs '
Total number of repli-
cated leaf inputs=0 for no
replicated component
or module.
Total number of trials to
be used in the simulation
Number of terms to be
used in the Central
Limit Theorem approximation
FREE COMPONENT FAILURE AND ERROR SPREAD DATA
No. of Variable Variable
I
MEDIAN (I)
I=1,2, e. ,FUN
FEN2(I)
I=1,2,...,FUN
Number of free component.
Failure rate X(hr~ )
associated with the I-th
free component
Error factor associated with
the I-th free component
NOTE: If MEDIAN(I)=0, then FEN2(I) must be equal.-to zero, i.e.,
FEN2(I)=0.
2
Entry
3
CARD GROUP XII:
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CARD GROUP XIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT FAILURE
AND ERROR SPREAD DATA
No. of Variable Variable
1 I
2
3
NOTE: 1
MEDIAN(J)
J=FUN+l,.. .,VEN
FUN2(J)
J=FUN+l,.. .,VEN
Number of replicated
component
Failure rate A(hr~ )
associated with the I-th
replicated component
Error factor associated
with the I-th rbeplicated
component
J=I+FUN
2. If MEDIAN(I)=O, then FEN2(I) must be equal to
i.e., FEN2(I)=O
3. VEN=FUN+DUN
RATE
Entry
zero,
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A. 4 Sample Fault Tree
For a fault tree given in Figure A.4.1, the input data are
provided as follows:
The input data are given for this fault tree for the four
classes of components and also for the Monte-Carlo simulation of
the tree.
Table A.1 presents input data for the logic of the tree.
Therefore, this part of the data is the same for both PL-MODT
and PL-MODMC.
Table A.2 presents the rest of the input data following data
set given in Table A.1, if the tree consists of only Class 1
components (i.e., PL-MOD steady state case).
Table A.3 presents the rest of the input data following data
set given in Table A.1, if the tree consists of only Class 2
components.
Table A.4 presents the rest of the input data following data
set given in Table A.1, if the tree consists of only Class 3
components.
Table A.5 presents the rest of input data following data set
in Table A.1, if the tree consists of Class 4 components, or
combination of different time-dependent classes of components.
Table A.6 presents the rest of input data following data set
given in Table A.1, if the tree is to be simulated by the Monte-
Carlo code.
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II
G12
G14
G17
G1s
1G22
G20
G23
I
4
G5
G6
G8
GIO
FIGURE A.1 SAMPLE FAULT TREE
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'SAAPLt. PROB Eg,
2 26 10
12 1 0 1
2 0 2
4 1 1 1
5 1 2 0
62 0 0
7 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
9, 0 2 1
10 0 2 0
11 2 2 0
12 1 0 1
13 0 1 1
14 2 00
1C 1 1
14 ) 3 0
17 1 0 1
18 2 0 0
19 1 _0 1
20 1 1 1
21 0 2 0
22 1 1 1
23 2 0 0
24 . 1 1
2c 1 0 1
26 0 2 1
7
1 1 2 4 1 14 0 0
2 2 1 3 0 0 1 22006
3 2 0 0 2 1 17 0 0
4 2 1 5 1 15 1 7 1n006
5 203 1 1 2 18 19 0 0
6 2 2 7 8 0 0 0 0
7 1 1 1 22 0 0
8 1 1 10 0 0 1 20007
9 2 0 0 2 20 21 1 2000
10 2 0 0 2 23 24 0 n
11 1 2 12 14 2 1 2 0 0
12 2 1 13 0 0 1 21001
13 1 0 0 1 6 1 29002
14 2 2 15 17 0 0 0 0
15 1 1 16 0 0 1 22001
16 2 0 -0 3 3 4 5 0 0.
17 1 1 1 0 0 1 29002
189 1 ? 19 22 0 0 0 0.
19 P 1 20 0 0 1, ~21004
29 1 1 1 2 1 1 20003
21 2 0 0 2 - 11 0 0
1? ? 1 23 1 7 1 21000
23 1 2 24 25 0 0 0 0
24 2 0 1 1 10 1 20003
2 P 2 1 26 0 0 1 2?004
26 1 0 0 2 12 1 2 00
1
TABLE A.1
GENERAL DATA SET REPRESENTING
THE LOGIC OF THE TREE
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TABLE A.27
1 . E-0 1
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1
CLASS 1 COMPONENTS (PL-MOD
14
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
17
18
19
20
21
22 
23
24
1
2.
3
4
5
6
7
FOR ONLY
CASE)
0
1 .OE-02
1.5E-03
1.5E-03
1 .2E-O1
1.01E-03
1
12
.OF-01
-10 -2
.0E-02
.OE-01
.OE-03
).5F-03
.5E-03
2. 0E-05
2.0F-04
2.0E-04
6. 1E-04
6. 1F-04
8. 1-04
.6E-02
.6E-02
3.OE-01
3.OE-O1
2.SE-04
2.-5 E- -0 t
2.5E-04
1 .E-02
.OE-011
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TABLE A .3
3
1 A
24
36
2&
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
17
13
14
2o17
14
20
21
2?2
23
?4
1
2
3
4
6
7
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1 FOR ONLY
CLASS 2 COMPONENTS
.OE-02
.5E-03
.5E-03
.'2F-01
.2E-01
1 .OE-03
180
240
720
7
1.OE-01
1.OE-01
1.OE-02
1 .0E-02
1.OE-02
1.0E-011 .OF-031.0E-03
0.5E-03
0.5E-03
2.0E-05
2.0F-04
2.0F-04
6.1E-04
6. 1E-04
. 1E-04.
.6E-02
.6F-02
3
.0E-01
3.OE-01
2.SE-04
2.5E-04
2.5E-04
?.5E-04
1 .0E-02
1.0E-01
0
1
1
1
1
1
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TABLE A.43
2
2
24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11)
12?
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1 FOR ONLY
CLASS 3 COMPONENTS
24
720
7
1.OE-01
1.OE-01
1 .OE-02
1.0E-02
1.OE-02
1.OE-01
1.OE-03
0.5E-03
0.SE-03
2.OE-05
2.OE-04
2.OE-04
6.1E-04
6. IE-04
8.1E-04
.6E-02
.6E-02.
3.0FE-01
3.OE-01
2.5E-04
2.5F-04
2.5E-04
2.5E-04
1.OE-02
1.OE-01
0
1.0E-02
1.5E-03
1.5E-03
I .2E-01
1.2E-01
1.OE-03
;* -() I ~1*. 0E-0 1I-.0E-o1
1.OE-01
1.OE-01
1.2E-o1
1.2E-Ol
1.2E-01
1 .2E-'01
1 .0E-02
1.OE-02?
1.0E-02
1 .OE-02
1.OE-02
1.0E-0I
1.0E-01'
1.oE-01
1.OE-01
5.OE-01
1 .OE-010 2
1.0 E-02
1.OE-02
1.oE-i
0
I.OE-01
1. fE-01
5.0 E-0 1 0 LE- 01
1 .OE-01
1.OE-0I
45
12 240
15
24 360
2 8
3As 1440
24 7
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TABLE A.5
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1 FOR ONLY CLASS 4 COMPONENTS
OR COMBINATION OF ALL TIME-DEPENDENT CLASSES OF COMPONENTS
1 1.OE-01 360 2 15 360 1
2 1.OE-01 400 3 18 700 1
3 1.OE-02 720 1.5 19 1440 1
4 1.OE-02 150 1 10 150 1
5 1.0E-02 1200 5 25 1?00 .5
6 1.OE-01 600 1 20 60o 1
7. 1.OE-03 720 1.5 19 800 0.5
8 0.5E-03
9 0.5E-03
10 ?.0E-05
11 2.0E-04
1? 2.0E-04
13 6.1E-04
14 6.1E-04
19 8.1E-0 4
16 .6E-02
17 .6E-02
120 1 12- 120 1
450 3 12.5 6001
720 1 22 72n 1
300 2.5 20 300 0.1
0 1.OE-01 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1.5E-01 0 0 0
720 1 12 720 1
400 2 15 400 1
0 a 0 0 0
19 3.OE-01. 120 1 12 120 1
19 3.OF-01
20 2.5E-04
21 2.5F-04
2P 2.5E-04
0 n 0 0 0
840 2.6 20 144 0.5
140 1.5 19 230 1
7?0 1.5 12 840 1
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TABLE A.5 (CONT.)
23 2.5E-04
24 1.OE-02
1 1.OE-01
2 0:
3 1.0E-02
4 1.'5E-.-03
5 1.5E-03
') 1.2E-01
7 1.2F-01
1.OE-03
0 1.OE-02 0 0 0
720 1.5 19 1440 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
450 2 16 720 1
0 0 0 0 0
1440 3 28 1440 1
720 1.5 19 720
440 1.5 20 440
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1 f.6 ? 1 .3
15; 80 16 8
13313
24 7 5000
1 1.AE-0]
? 1.('E-01
3 1.OE-02
4 1.0F-02
53 1.OE-02
6 1 .0E-01
7 1.OE-03
- 0.5E-03
9 0.5E-03
1 n- ?2.0E97- 05
11 ?.OE-04
1 ? ;? . *0 - 04
13 -1 4,.1EF-04
14 6.IE-04
1 R.1E-04
16 .6E-02
17 .E-02
1 3.oE-01
10 3.Oc-01
2n ?. 5-0 4
21 2.c;.
?? ?.5E-04
23 2.5E-04
24 1.0E-O02
I 1,OE-01
20
3 1.OE-02
4 .E-03
5 1.-03
p 1.2p-01
7 1.2E- '1
2.5 4 5 5 10 6
17 9'1 18 95 1 9
15 7 20 8 25 c .0 10 40 11
97.5 20 99 21 9'.5
50 12 60 13 70 14 75
0
3
5
3
2
5
TABLE A.6
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1 FOR A MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION
12
5
3
10
7
5
3
8
5
10
10
8
3
7
l.U
5
10
6
6
8
6
2
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APPENDIX B
MIN-CUT-SET GENERATION OF COMPLEX FAULT TREES BY USING PL-MODT
B.1 Introduction
It was found that in large fault trees, some replicated
components exist within a replicated module that are repeated
elsewhere in the fault tree. As was discussed in Chapter 5,
the code PL-MODT is actually not able to handle automatically
this type of fault tree. Therefore, a method was developed to
qualitatively solve this problem with PL-MODT and hence to
generate minimal simple cut-sets. 1
In essence, this method consists of a treatment of higher-
order modules of the fault tree as supercomponents by neglecting
the presence of replications outside the domain of the replicated
module. The replacement of these replicated modules by a
replicated component will provide a basis for starting the
analysis. For example, the SNM fault tree [2], which is used
as an example, is solved in the next section. It was found that
there are four replicated modules that can be replaced by an
imaginary supercomponent. After this replacement, the original
fault tree becomes substantially smaller with only 26 replicated
and non-replicated events being present. The modular cut-sets
1 Simple cut-sets consist of only simple components and not
modules.
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can simply be found by PL-MODT for the original tree as well as
the superevents (i.e., the replicated modules). Due to the
replacement of replicated modules, it was discovered that some
replicated components will appear only once within the original
fault tree or replicated modules (i.e., replication presents
elsewhere in the tree, but repeated only one time within the
replicated module's domain). This special .case was treated by
simply connecting a replicated pair to the top event of the
module via an arbitrary OR gate. Figure B.1 demonstrates this
procedure.
New top event
of the repli-
cated module
+ OR
R
Old top event
of the repli-
cated module
*AND
I a
FIGURE B.1 
ADDITION OF A REPLICATED PAIR TO A FAULT TREE
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This enables the PL-MODT code to find the modular cut-sets
of the replicated module with an additional order one cut-set
consisting of only the replicated component R that is eliminated
from the list of cut-sets. The rest of the cut-sets are the exact
modular cut-sets of the replicated module.
These modular cut-sets are then used to generate simple cut-sets.
The method is very simple. Modular cut-sets are only composed of
some replicated component inputs and some simple OR and AND modules.
An OR simple module of 10 component inputs consists of 10 order one
cut-sets, and an AND simple module of 10 component inputs consists of
only 1 order ten cut-set. By removing each module in the modular
cut-sets by its associated simple cut-sets, one is able to find all
of the simple cut-sets in the replicated module. This procedure cannot
presently be performed by the code, and thus some of the lower-order
cut -sets of the replicated modules were found by hand off-line.
The modular cut-sets of the original tree are used to determine
the simple minimal cut-sets. These modular cut-sets consist of
replicated modules (i.e., the superevents whose simple cut-sets
are found before), replicated components and simple modules.
In a similar way, by assigning corresponding cut-sets from the
replicated modules and from the simple modules, one is able to
generate all of the cut-sets of the fault tree.
Replicated events which are repeated outside the domain of
the replicated module are found in some of the cut-sets of the
tree. These replicated components would appear more than one
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time within some of the generated simple cut-sets and, therefore,
the presence of only one of them is sufficient whereas the rest
of them must be eliminated from the cut-sets.
Finally, from these simple cut-sets only minimal cut-sets
should be selected by using the same procedure which is already
applied in the codes PL-MOD and PL-MODT to find minimal modular
cut-sets.
The method described above has been applied to determine the
cut-sets of the SNM fault tree and some of the simple cut-sets
are derived. These cut-sets are presented in Table B.12.
To generate all of the cut-sets, the problem becomes trivial and
the use of computer is hardly recommended. A subroutine is
therefore necessary to be incorporated into the PL-MODT code for
the generation of cut-sets. The cut-sets found in Table B.12 are
the lowest-order cut-sets in the SNM fault tree.
B.2 Example
The code PL-MODT was used in order to find the modular
minimal cut-sets for the Test Bed Design Fault Tree for SNM Diversion
at Pump Washout Line [21. This fault tree consists of 125 gates,
95 simple components and 18 replicated components. Also, 9
replicated gates (modules) were presented. (See Figure B.2, Page 205).
First, higher order modular cut-sets were found. These cut-
sets contain some modules that contain many cut-sets of lower
order. Second, minimal cut-sets for these higher-order modules
were found. Therefore, combination of these cut-sets would
provide probably most of the presented simple cut-sets.
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Table B.1 identifies different components in this fault
tree. In order to simplify the cut-sets, Table B.2 gives the
identification of higher order modules that are presented in
this fault tree; then Table B.3 lists all of the modular minimal
cut-sets in terms of those higher modules in Table B.2.
In Table B.4 are listed minimal cut-sets presented in the
module G1 5.
TABLE B.4
MINIMAL CUT-SETS FOR THE MODULE 15
Cut-Set No. 1 2
1 7
2 R
3 9
4 8
5 6 R13
In Table B.5 we have identified the components and modules
presented in the higher-order module 50 (G50 ). The cut-sets for
this higher-order module are listed in Table B.6. Note that the
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TABLE B.1
DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPONENTS IN THE TEST BED DESIGN
FAULT TREE, IN PL-MODT AND FTAP
PL-MODT FTAP PL-MODT~ FTAP PL-MODT FTAP PL-MODT FTAP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
ANODEl
CBElHIT
TPEQMM
CBEEBHIT
CBEEAHIT
SRCB
ALARMLX
ALARMIR
ALARMIT
GFAIL13
GAMB01LX
GAMB01HI
GAMB01IR
GAMB01IT
SRGAMB01
CSNMRMAA
GCCASF
GCCASLOW
ALCCAS
AA-DHIT
SRCDALRM
CDALRMLX
CDALRMIR
CDALRMIT
ACCAS
WEIGHTOR
WEIGHTIT
WEIGHTIR
WEGT3
SRWEIGHT
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
NOMCCAS
MDCCASIT
MDCCASHI
MDCCASIR
MDCCASIT
ADV20OMT
ADVlKGMT
SRMDW
TDR2-G
SRMDS
CBE2RHIT
CBE2LHIT
GAMB02HI
GAMB02LX
GAMB02IR
GAMB02IT
SRGAMB02
RDCCASLX
RDCCASHI
RDCCASIT
RDCCASIR
MC2-OPO
SRRDCCAS
APM-Bl
AFILLCON
ANODE706
CONAT706
V290
CV436I R
CV436IT
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
TGTTKFIL
V7130
PRMODE
MPU709
V7190
T701GT45
V7220
LS7221R
LS7221T
LS722CIR
LS722CIT
V7010
TLEVEL-1
SENSLOWM
TKlFILL
DPCELLIR
DPCELLIT
TGTPROMD
T722GT45
LABFALSE
SENSLOWP
TLTLAB
T7011545
TGTLAB
LS701IR
LS701IT
LS701CIR
LS701CIT
T722GT15
T701GT15
91
92
93
94
95
Ri
R2
R 3
R4 0
R 5
R6
R 7
R8
R 9
R1 0
R17
R12
R 13
R14
R 15
R16
R 17
R18
GBOFAIL
GBOSLOW
GARFAIL
GARSLOW
T7221545
SRMSOLN
SRDUEST
T722LT15
APM-AL
CCASOK
AMP-AR
AMP-BO
TDR1-G
TPNESM
TPNETM
CDLI
SRLS701
TDR3-G
MCl-OPO
SRLS722
T701LT15
ANODEl4
ASUBHNO
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Table B.2
HIGHER ORDER MODULE OF THE TEST BED DESIGN
FAULT TREE
Name of the module,
replicated component, Corresponding Corresponding
or simple component name in the ori- name in the
No. in PL-MODT ginal fault tree FTAP
1 G  MPU2
M
2 G M MPU5
3 GM INADEQUATE RESPONSEFROM MC SYSTEM WHEN
CRASH BAR EEB IS
HIT
4 G INADEQUATE GUARD ---G81  RESPONSE IN AREA AR
WHEN ADV/MAN CROSSES
PM - AR
TABLE B.3
ORIGINAL TREE MODULAR MINIMAL-CUT-SETS
Cut Set
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 R R10  G24 1
2 R R G50  R 2 1
4 B7  50 90 15
3 R Ry 7 50 R10 2 G 15 1
4 R 17  R6  R7 G50 Rg 10 16 2 13
5 R 1 7  R6  R7  G5 0  R9 10 16 2 14
6 R 7  R6  R7 G50 R9 10 16 2 12
7 R 1 7  R6  R 7  50 R 10 16 2 11
R 1 7  R6  7 5 0  R9  R 10 16 2
9 R 7 R6  R7 G50 R9 R13 10 16 2 15
10 R 1 7  R6  R G50 R0 2 15 5 81
11 R 1 7  R6  R G50 G15  5 G81 4 42
12 R 1 7  R6  R G 7 5 0  R R13 G15 5 G81 4 41 42 47
13 R17 6 7 50 G15 5 G81 4 41 42 46 45 43 44
H
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TABLE B. 5
IDENTIFICATION OF DIFFERENT MODULES IN THE PRIME MODULE G5 0
PL-MODT THE ORIGINAL TREE
N5 8  INADEQUATE MC RESPONSE WHEN VALVE
722-1 OPEN
M6 2  INADEQUATE MC RESPONSE TO CHANGE
IN PU MASS IN TANK 1, MPUTK1 (-1)
M6 7  INADEQUATE MC RESPONSE WHEN VALVE
701-1 OPEN
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TABLE B.6
MINIMAL CUT-SETS FOR MODULE 50
Cut-Set No.
J
]
]
I
I
2
5
50 R8
0 11
714 R1 5 R1 2
50 R8  75 R1 5 R1 2
50 R8  76 R1 5 R1 2 1
50 R8  1 3 R1 5 R1 2 R1  78
50 R8  R1 8 R1 3 R1 5 R1 2 R2  84
50 R8  R1 8 R15 R1 2 80 81 82
50 R8  R18 68 R1 2 80 81 
82
50 R8  R1 8 69 R1 2 80 81 
82
50 R8  R18 70 R12 80 81 
82
50 R8  R 18 85 R15 80 81 82
50 R8  R18 86 R1 5 80 81 
82
50 8  R18 87 R15 80 81 82
50 R8  R18 88 R15 80 81 82
50 R8  R18 71 R12 80 81 
82
50 R8  R1 3 85 R15 1  78
50 8  R1 3 86 R15  1 78
50  8  R1 3 87 R15 R 1  78
50 R8  R1 3 88 R15 R1 78
50 8R 1368R12R2850 R8  13 68B 12 R2 8
50 R8  R1 3 69 R12 H 2  84
50 R 8  R13 , 70 R 12 R 2  84
50 H8  R1 3 71 R12 84
50 8 13 RI R 12
8 18  1 3 68 R1 2  2  8 50
(CONT.)
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Table B.6
(cont.)
MINIMAL CUT-SETS FOR MODULE 50
Cut-Set No.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
R
8
R 8
R8
~ 8
-
8
R8
S8
R8
R
8
R1 3
R18
R1 8
R1 8 R13
R1 8 R1 3
R R1 3
R1 8 R1 3
H1 8 H1 3
R1 8 R13
R1 8 R13
M67 M 62
M67 M6 2
M 58 M6 2
M 58 M67
R1 3 M58
M5 8 M6 7
69
70
[1
d85
d6
87
M50
R15
R1 2
R 1
M67
80o
R12
R 12
R 12
R1 5
R15
R15
R1 5
2 450
R2 04 M50
R2 84 M50
R2 54 M50
R2 d4 M50
R 2 84 M 50
R 2 84 M 50
+-Contains 64
-Contains 16
-Contains 16
M50  +-Contains 16
64 M5 0+-Contains 16
82 M50-+Contains 16
TOTAL SIMPLE CUT-SETS 175 X 2 = 350
M50
M50
78
R
2
81
simple cut-sets
simple cut-sets
simple cut-sets
simple cut-sets
simple cut-sets
simple cut-sets
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following components are always required to fail in order to
have the failure of module 50:(MPU5), 55, 56, 57, 54, 58, 61,
63, 62, 64, 65, 67, 72, 73, and (59 or 60). We call, for
simplicity, all of these components module 50 (M50).
Cut-sets in Table B.6 are on the order of between 14 and 20.
It should be noted that the total number of cut-sets for the
higher-order module (G 50) is 350. For the modules 58, 62 and 67,
the cut-sets are given in Table B.7. All of the cut-sets are
on an order of 1 (e.g., failure of each component 68, 69, 60, or
71 would cause the failure of the module 58).
TABLE B.7
CUT-SETS FOR MODULES 58, 62, and 67
Module
1 2 3 4
Cut-Set
Order
M58  68 69 70 71
M62 74 75 76 77
M67 85 86 87 88
For higher-order module G the cut-sets were found. Table B.8
gives an identification of components in the cut-sets and their
corresponding name in the fault tree. Table B.9 lists all of the
cut-sets for this prime module.
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TABLE B.8
IDENTIFICATION OF DIFFERENT MODULES IN THE PRIME MODULE 81
PL-MODT THE ORIGINAL TREE
M 1NO RESPONSE FROM MC SYSTEM
Ma NO MC RESPONSE FROM MC SYSTEM
WHEN VALVE 701 OPEN
M 10 NO MC RESPONSE FROM ESTIMATION
WHEN VALVE 722 OPEN
TABLE B.9
CUT-SETS FOR THE MODULE 81
Cut-sets
1 R1 5  R1 2  79 66 R1  1
2 R1 5  R1 2  79 66 R1  2
3 R1 5  R1 2  79 66 R2  1
4 R1 5  R 1 2  79 66 R2  2
5 M11  M8  M 10  Containing 112 cut-seto
6 R
7 R15 M 1M10+ Containing 28 cut-sets
8 R1 2  M11  M8  79 +-Containing 28 cut-sets
9 R1 5  R1 2  80 95 79
10 R15 R12 81 95 79
11 R1 5  R1 2  82 95 79
12 R1 5  R1 2  74 95 79
13 . 15 R1 2  76 95 79
14 R1 5  R1 2  77 95 79
15 R1 5  R1 2  75 95 79
TOTAL SIMPLE CUT-SETS 180
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As can be seen from Table B.9, the total number of cut-sets
for higher-order- module 81 is 180 simple cut-sets. These cut-sets
are of an order between 1 and 6.
Now, from Table B.3 all of the simple cut-sets for modular
cut-sets 2 through 13 could be found by simply assigning the
corresponding simple cut-sets of different modules from Tables
B.4, B.6, and B.9. The total number of simple cut-sets in these
12.modular cut-sets is 1,265,600.
For the first modular cut-set in Table B.3, we have to find
simple cut-sets for the module G2 4. These cut-sets were found
and Table B.10 describes different components of these cut-sets
and their corresponding name in PL-MODT. Table B.11 lists all of
the cut-sets presented in the module G2 4, based on the names of
the modules given in Table B.10. As could be seen from Tables
B.10 and B.11, all of the cut-sets contain module G50 which by
itself has 350 different cut-sets (see Table B.6). Some other
higher-order modules are also contained in most of the cut-sets
in Table B.11. Therefore, a very high rough estimate of the
number of simple cut-sets in Table B.11 could be about 6 million.
By assigning different simple cut-sets of module 24 into the
first modular cut-set in Table B.3, we would be able to find the
rest of the cut-sets for the fault tree.
It should be noticed, however, that not all of these simple
cut-sets are minimal for the modular cut-set number 1. Therefore,
it is not possible to estimate the exact number of minimal simple
cut-sets in this fault tree. In the future development of the
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PL-MODT code, the combination of these tables will be done by.
computer and nonminimal cut-sets will be eliminated automatically.
By the combination of Tables B.4, B.6, B.9 and B.11, we have
found some of these simple cut-sets. These cut-sets are listed
in Table B.12.
TABLE B.10
IDENTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS IN THE MODULE 24
Module Number
as Listed in Type of Components in this
Table B.11 Module Module
1 AND R5
2 AND R
3 AND R13
4 AND R15
5 AND R12
6 AND R
7 AND G,7 8 G5 0 , R , R9
8 OR 48, 49, 50, 51
9 OR 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
10 -- --
11 -- --
12 AND 52, 53
13 AND 36, 38, 39
14 AND 37, 40
15 AND 19, 20
16 AND 25
17 OR 17, 18
18 -- --
19 OR 22, 23, 24
20 OR 26, 27, 28
21 OR R1 , R2
22 OR 68, 69, 70, 71
23 OR 85, 86, 87, 88
24 OR 74, 75, 76, 77
25 AND 21
26 AND 30, R8, 29
27 AND 89
28 AND 90
(CONTINUED)
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Table B.10
(cont.)
IDENTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS IN THE MODULE 24
Module Number
as Listed in Type of Components in this
Table B.11 Module Module
29 AND R3
30 AND R16
31 AND R18
32 OR 80, 81, 82
189
TABLE B.11
(Next 14 Pages)
LISTS OF ALL THE MIN-CUT-SETS IN THE PRIME MODULE G
(In this table, different components of each cut set are
numbered according to those modules listed in Table B.10.)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 1 7 8 9 15 17 19 21
2 1 7 8 9 16 17 20 21
3 1 2 7 8 13 15 17 19 21
4 1 2 7 8 13 16 17 20 21
5 1 2 3 7 8 14 15 17 19 21
6 1 2 3 7 8 14 16 17 20 21
7 1 6 7 9 15 17 21
8 1 6 7 9 16 17 20 21
9 1 2 6 7 13 15 17 21
10 1 2 6 7 13 16 17 20 21
11 1 2 3 6 7 14 15 17 21
12 1 2 3 6 7 14 10 17 20 21
13 1 2 3 7 9 12 15 17 19 21
14 1 2 3 7 9 12 16 17 20 21
15 1 2 3 7 12 13 15 17 19 21
16 1 2 3 7 12 13 16 17 20 21
17 1 2 3 7 12 14 15 17 19 21
18 1 2 3 7 12 14 16 17 20 21
19 1 7 8 9 15 18 19 22 23 24
20 1 7 8 9 16 18 20 22 23 24
21 2 7 7 13 13 15 18 19 22 23 24
22 1 2 7 8 13 16 18 20 22 23 24
23 1 2 3 7 8 14 15 18 19 22 23 24
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
47 1 2 3 7 8 9 10 16 17 21
48 1 2 3 7 12 14 15 18 22 23 24 25
49 1 2 7 8 9 16 17 21 26
50 1 2 7 8 9 16 18 22 23 24 26
51 1 2 7 8 13 16 17 21 26
52 1 2 7 8 13 16 18 22 23 24 26
53 1 2 3 7 8 14 16 17 21 26
54 1 2 3 7 8 14 16 18 22 23 24 26
55 1 2 6 7 9 16 17 21 26
56 1 2 6 7 9 16 18 26
57 1 2 6 7 13 16 17 21 26
58 1 2 6 7 13 16 18 26
59 1 2 3 6 7 14 16. 17 21 26
60 1 2 3 6 7 14 16 18 26
61 1 2 3 7 9 12 16 17 21 26
62 1 2 3 7 9 12 16 18 22 23 24 26
63 1 2 ~3 7 12 13 16 17 21 26
64 1 2 3 7 12' 13 16 18 22 23 24 26
65 1 2 3 7 12 14 16 17 21 26
66 1 2 3 7 12 14 16 18 22 23 24 26
67 1 4 7 8 9 15 17 19 27
68 1 3 4 7 8 9 15 17 25 27
69 1 4 7 8 9 14 15 18 27
193
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
70 1 2 4 7 8 9 16 17 26 27
71 1 2 4 7 8 13 15 17 19 27
72 1 2 3 4 7 8 13 15 17 25 27
73 1 2 4 7 8 13 16 17 20 27
74 1 2 4 7 8 13 16 17 26 27
75 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 15 17 19 27
76 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 15 17 25 27
77 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 16 17 20 27
78 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 16 17 26 27
79 1 4 6 7 9 15 17 27
80 1 4 6 7 9 16 17 20 27
81 1 2 4 6 7 9 16 17 26 27
82 1 2 4 6 7 13 15 17 27
83 1 2 4 6 7 13 16 17 20 27
84 1 2 4 6 7 13 16 17 26 27
85 1 2 3 4 6 7 14 15 17 27
86 1 2 3 4 6 7 14 16 17 20 27
87 1 2 3 4 6 7 14 16 17 26 27
88 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 17 19 27
89 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 17 25 27
90 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 16 17 20 27
91 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 16 17 25 27
194
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
92 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 15 17 19 27
93 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 15 25 27 17
94 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 16 17 27
95 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 16 17 26 27
96 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 15 17 27 19
97 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 15 17 25 27
98 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 16 17 20 27
99 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 16 17 26 27
100 1 5 7 8 9 15 17 28 19
101 1 3 5 7 8 9 15 17 25 28
102 1 5 7 8 9 16 17 20 28
103 1 2 5 7 8 9 16 17 26 28
104 1 2 5 7 8 13 15 17 28
105 1 2 3 5 7 8 13 15 17 25 28
106 1 2 5 7 8 13 16 17 20 28
107 1 2 5 7 8 13 16 ~17 26 28
108 1 5 7 8 14 15 17 19 28
109 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 15 17 25 28
110 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 16 17 20 28
111 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 16 17 26
112 1 5 6 7 9 15 17 28
113 1 5 6 7 9 16 17 20 28
195
1 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
114 1 2 5 6 7 9 16 17 26 28
115 1 2 5 6 7 13 15 17 28
116 1 2 5 6 7 13 16 17 20 28
117 1 2 5 6 7 13 16 17 26 28
118 1 2 3 5 6 7 14 15 17 28
119 1 2 3 5 6 7 14 16 17- 20 28
120 1 2 3 5 6 7 14 16 17 26 28
121 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 17 19 28
122 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 17 25 28
123 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 17 20 28
124 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 17 26 28
125 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 17 19 28
126 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 17 25 28
127 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 16 17 20 28
128 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 16 17 26 28
129 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 15 17 19 28
130 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 15 17 28 25
131 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 16 17 20 28
132 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 16 17 26 28
133 1 4 7 8 9 15 18 19 23 24 29
134 1 3 4 7 8 9 15 18 23 24 25 29
135 1 4 7 8 9 16 18 20 23 24 29
196
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
136 1 2 4 7. 8 9 16 18 23 24 26 29
137 1 2 4 7 8 13 15 18 19 23 24 29
138 1 2 3 4 7 8 13 15 18 23 24 25 29
139 1 2 4 7 8 13 16 18 20 23 24 29
140 1 2 4 7 8 13 16 18 23 24 26 29
141 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 15 18 19 23 24 29
142 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 15 18 23 24 25 29
143 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 16 18 20 23 24 29
144 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 16 18 23 24 26 29
145 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 18 19 23 24 29
146 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 18 23 24 25 29
147 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 16 18 20 23 24 29
148 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 16 18 23 24 26 29
149 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 15 18 19 23 24 29
150 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 15 18 23 24 25 29
151 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 16 18 20 23 24 29
152 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 16 18 23 24 26 29
153 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 15 18 19 23 24 29
154 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 15 18 23 24 25 29
155 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 16 18 23 24 20 29
156 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 16 18 23 24 26 29
157 1 5 7 8 9 15 18 14 22 24 30
197
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
158 1 3 5 7 8 9 15 18 22 24 25 30
159 1 3 4 5 7 8 9 15 18 24 25 29 30
160 1 5 7 8 9 16 18 20 22 24 30
161 1 4 5 7 8 9 16 18 20 24 29 30
162 1 2 5 7 8 9 16 18 22 24 26 30
163 1 2 4 5 7 8 9 16 18 24 26 29 30
164 1 2 5 7 8 13 15 18 22 24 30 19
165 1 2 4 5 7 8 13 15 18 19 24 29 30
166 1 2 3 5 7 8 13 15 18 12 24 25 30
167 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 13 15 18 24 25 29 30
168 1 2 5 7 8 13 16 18 20 22 24 25 29 30
169 1 2 4 5 7 8 13 16 18 20 24 29 30
170 1 2 5 7 8 13 16 18 22 24 26 30
171 1 2 4 5 7 8 13 16 18 24 26 29 30
172 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 15 18 19 22 24 30
173 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 14 15 18 19 24 29 30
174 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 15 18 22 24 25 30
175 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 14 15 18 24 25 29 30
176 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 16 18 20 22 24 30
177 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 14 16 18 20 24 29 30
178 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 16 18 22 24 26 30
179 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 14 16 18 24 26 29 30
198
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
180 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 18 19 22 24 30
181 1 2 3 4 5 7 -9 12 15 18 19 24 29 30
182 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 18 22 24 25 30
183 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 18 24 25 5' 29 30
184 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 18 20 22 24 30
185 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 16 18 20 24 29 30
186 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 -16 18 22 24 26 30
187 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 16- 18 24 26 29 30
188 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 18 19 22 24 30
189 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 15 18 19 24 29 30
190 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 18 22 24 25 30
191 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 15 18 24 25 29 30
192 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 18 20 22 24 30
193 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 16 18 20 24 29 30
194 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 16 18 22 24 26 30
195 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 16 18 24 26 29 30
196 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 15 18 19 22 24 30
197 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 15 18 19 24 29 5 30
198 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 15 18 22 24 25 30
199 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 14 15 18 24 25 29 30
200 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 30
201
199
1
202 1
203 1
204 1
205 1
206 1
207 1
208 1
209 1
210 1
211 1
212 1
213 1
214 1
215 1
216 1
217 1
218 1
219 1
220 1
221 1
222 1
223 1
5
5
7
5
15
9
9
8
9
8
8
7
16
9
9
8
9
8
8
7
13
8
8
6 7 8 9
7 12 14 16
12 14 16 18
7 12 14 16
18 19 22 31
15 18 19 22
15 18 19 23
9 15 18 19
15 18 22 23
9 15 18 22
9 15 18 23
8 9 15 18
19 20 22 23
16 18 20 22
16 18 20 23
9 16 18 20
16 18 22 26
9 16 18 22
9 16 18 23
8 9 16 18
15 18 19 22
13 15 18 19
13 15 18 19
10
18
22
18
32
30
29
29
25
25
25
25
31
30
29
29
21
26
26
26
31
22
23
11
20
24
24
31
31
30
31
30
29
29
32
31
31
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32
30
29
29
32
30
29
12
24
26
26
32
32
31
32
31
31
30
32
32
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31
31
30
31
31
32
32
32
13 14 15 16
29 30
30
29 30
32
32
32
31 32
32
32
32
31
200
1
224 1
225 1
226 1
227 1
228 1
229 1
230 1
231 1
232 1
233 1
234 1
235 1
236 1
237 1
238 1
239 1
240 1
241 1
242 1
243 1
244 1
245 1
5
7
8
7
7
5
13
8
8
7
13
8
8
7
8
7
7
5
8
7
7
5
8
6 7 8 9
8 13 15 18
13 15 18 22
8 13 15 18
8 13 15 18
7 8 13 15
16 18 21 22
13 16 18 20
13 16 18 20
8 13 16 18
16 18 22 23
13 16 18 22
13 16 18 23
8 13 16 18
14 15 18 19
8 14 15 18
8 14 15 18
7 8 14 15
14 15 18 22
8 14 15 18
8 14 15 18
7 8 14 15
14 16 18 20
10 11 12
19 29 30
23 25 31
22 25 30
23 25 29
18 25 29
23 31 32
22 30 31
23 29 31
20 29 30
26 31 32
25 29 30
26 29 31
26 29 30
22 23 31
19 22 30
19 23 29
18 20 29
23 25 31
22 24 30
23 25 29
18 25 29
22 23 31
13 14 15 16
31 32
32
31 32
31 32
30 31 32
32
32
31 32
31
32
31 32
32
31 32
31 32
30 31 32
32
31 32
31 32
30 31 32
32
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
246 1 2 3 5 7 8 14 16 18
247 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 16 18
248 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 14 16
249 1 2 3 7 8 14 16 18 22
250 1 2 3 5 7 14 16 18 22
251 1 2 3 4 7 8 14 16 18
252 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 14 16
253 1 2 3 7 9 12 15 18 19
254 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 18
255 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 18
256 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 15
257 1 2 3 7 9 12 15 18 22
258 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 15 18
259 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 15 18
260 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 15
261 1 2 3 7 9 12 16 18 20
262 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 18
263 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 16 18
264 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 16
265 1 2 3 7 9 12 16 18 22
266 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 18
267 1 2 3 4 7 9 12 16 18
10 11
20 22
20 23
18 20
23 26
26 30
23 26
18 26
22 23
19 22
19 23
18 19
23 25
22 25
23 25
18 25
22 23
20 22
20 23
18 20
23 26
22 30
23 26
12
30
29
29
31
31
29
29
31
30
29
29
31
30
29
29
31
30
29
29
31
31
29
13
31
31
30
32
32
31
30
32
31
31
30
32
31
31
30
32
31
31
30
32
32
31
14 15 16
32
32
31 32
32
31
32
32
31
32
32
31
32
32
31
32
32
32
32
32
202
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
268 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 16 18 26 29 30 31 32
269 1 2 3 7 12 13 15 18 19 22 23 31 32
270 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 18 19 22 30 31 32
271 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 15 18 19 23 29 31 32
272 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 15 18 19 29 30 31 32
273 1 2 3 7 12 13 15 18 22 23 25 31 32
274 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 15 18 22 25 30 31 32
275 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 15 18 23 25 29 31 32
276 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 15 18 25 29 30 31 32
277 1 2 3 7 12 13 16 18 20 22 23 31 32
278 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 16 18 20 22 30 31 32
279 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 16 18 23 29 31 32 20
280 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 16 18 20 29 30 31. 32
281 1 2 3 7 12 13 16 18 22 23 26 31 32
282 1 2 3 5 7 12 13 16 18 22 26 30 31 32
283 1 2 3 4 7 12 13 16 18 23 26 29 31 32
284 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 13 16 18 26 29 30 31 32
285 1 2 3 7 12 14 15 18 19 22 23 31 32
286 1 2 3 5 7 12 14 .15 18 19 22 30 31 32
287 1 2 3 4 7 12 14 15 18 19 23 29 31 32
288 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 14 15 18 19 29 30 31 32
289 1 2 3 7 12 14 15 18 22 23 25 31 32
203
1
290 1
291 1
292 1
293 1
294 1
295 1
296 1
297 1
298 1
299 1
5 6
7 12
7 12
5 7
12 14
7 12
7 12
5 7
12 14
7 12
7 12
7 8 9
14 15 18
14 15 18
12 14 15
16 18 20
14 16 18
14 16 18
12 14 16
16 18 22
14 16 18
14 ~ 16 18
10
22
23
18
22
20
20
18
23
22
23
11
25
25
25
23
22
23
20
26
26
26
12
30
29
29
31
30
29
29
31
30
29
300 1 2 3 4 5 7 12 14 16 18 26 29 30 31 32
13
31
31
30
32
31
31
30
32
31
31
14 15 16
32
32
31 32
32
32
31 32
32
32
TABLE B.12
SOME SIMPLE CUT-SETS OF THE ORIGINAL FAULT TREE
Cut-
Set
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 R4 R7 R 2 1 55 56 57 54 58 59 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73 R
2 R4 R7 R9  2 1 55 56 57 54 58 60 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73 R
3 R4 R7 Ri 2 1 55 56 57 54 58 60 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73 R
c4 R4 R7 R1  2 1 55 56 57 54 58 59 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73 R
5 R 1 7R6 R 7 55 56'57 54 58 59 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73 R 1 1R9 10 16 2 13
6 R 1 7R6 R 7 55 56 57 54 58 59 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73 R  R9 10 16 2 14
7 R 7R6 R7 55 56 57 54 58 60 61 63 62 69 65 67 72 73R 11 9 10 16 2 14
Only 4 simple cut-sets of an order 20 exists.
These cut-sets are listed above.
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